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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyses several articles by Professor Joseph Nye Jr. and one by doctoral 
candidate Roger Smith. Those articles analyse international and domestic nuclear arms 
control and disarmament policies within the framework of 'regime theory'. The thesis 
uses a methodology derived eclectically from various postmodern and postructural 
analysts, and in particular adapts ideas from Derrida and Foucault.
The thesis argues that Nye and Smith's work exemplify western 'security' discourse 
which has a narrative structure that is super-power centric, and in particular U.S.- centric, 
as is now common in mainstream international relations journals. They tend to reproduce 
a particular discursive formation: that of a constructed U.S. dominance, or hegemony, 
regarding the formation (Nye), boundaries and elements (Nye and Smith), and 
maintenance (Nye and Smith) of the nuclear nonproliferation 'regime' (hereafter NNPR). 
The role of 'learning' within regime theory is also 'critically' reviewed.
The thesis challenges this discourse by identifying the hierarchical oppositions on which 
it relies, the rhetorical devices which ground the argument, and the contradictions within 
the texts which undermine their conclusions. The meanings attributed to terms and their 
reflection of ideological and conceptual values are also examined to show how they 
'ground' the text to a coherent meaning or conceptual hierarchy.
The sub-thesis concludes with a brief prospective assessment of the regime. It suggests 
that although Nye's and Smith's liberal 'regime' theory is correct in identifying the 
potential feedback effect of 'regimes' on domestic state politics and international social 
movements, these dynamics do not yet occupy their proper place in their work. The 
extent to which current developments within the regime accord with theoretical 
expectations is also examined and doubts are raised about the role and effect of learning 
and of hegemonic decline.
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INTRODUCTION
(i) Critical Theory and International Relations Scholarship
An increasing number of students of international relations and international law are 
adopting 'critical', 'post-international', 'postmodern' and 'poststructural' analyses 1 
when assessing discourses^ concerning global affairs^. Broadly indebted to 'critical 
theory', such analysts draw on the diverse insights of philosophers such as Lacan, 
Barthes, Marcuse, Gadamer, Saussure, Derrida, Foucault, and Habermas^-. They tend
1 These terms are rarely defined clearly. Characteristics emphasised in 'critical' analyses 
include play, chance, anarchy, deconstruction, antithesis, rhetoric, indeterminancy and 
imminence: I. Hassan, 'The Culture of Postmodernism', Theory. Culture and Society. 
vol.2, no.3,1985, pp.119-131, while post-structuralism is characterised by a rejection of 
socially sanctioned, rigid and predictable systems of meaning (as in structuralism and 
semiotics): R. Harland, Superstructuralism: The Philosophy of Structuralism and Post- 
Structuralism . Methuen, London, 1987, pp. 123-124. Some critical theorists argue 
further that meanings attributed to language are the result of larger ideological systems in 
society. For Foucault and Pecheaux in particular, 'texts' and the meanings attributed to 
words are the result of social discursive formations, or relationships between social actors 
mediated through 'understood' discrepancies in power: D. Birch, Language. Literature 
and Critical Practice: Wavs of Analysing Text. Routledge, London, 1989, p.15.
2 Discourses can be defined as the various means of representing and perpetuating social 
'reality'. Discourses are also power relations in that differing conceptions of reality 
compete for popular legitimacy: T. O'Sullivan, J. Hartley, D. Saunders and J. Fiske 
(eds), Kev Concepts in Communication. Methuen, London, 1983, pp.72-76.
3 This has come to be known as 'the third debate'. A recent review of this scholarship is 
in a special issue of International Studies Quarterly: vol.34, 1990, and see in particular: J. 
George, J. and D. Campbell, 'Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: 
Critical Social Theory and International Relations', International Studies Quarterly. 
vol.34, 1990, pp.269-293. Some of the literature is also canvassed in R. Higgott (ed.), 
New Directions in International Relations: Australian Perspectives. Canberra Studies in 
World Affairs No. 23, Department of International Relations, Australian National 
University, Canberra, 1988.
4 Althusser, Saussure, Habermas and Gramsci tend to be included as critical theorists but 
they are more classifiable as structuralist neo-Marxists, and therefore, 'positivist'.
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to assail central tenets of Enlightenment thinking^, including the idolization of reason, 
the assumption that history can be theorised 'objectively' by a knowing subject, and that 
language in discourse is a neutral, transparent medium. 'Critical' theory suggests rather 
that 'empirical observation' is largely 'theory dependent'*7, and that texts derive their 
meaning from discursive formations which reflect the ideological systems of society, not 
from allegedly 'objective' meanings attaching to words^. Language thus structures 
thought rather than merely reflecting 'reality'^.
Postructuralism also suggests that social theories tend to be constructed around perceived 
'historical conditions' and are dynamic, changing as perceptions of history change^. It 
invites a genealogical reading of theory - an assessment of how and why theories are 
constructed at a particular time and in a particular place. Although the tracing of 
perceptions over time will not be explored in this thesis, a genealogical
reading would demonstrate the way is which the signifierlO 'regime', which has a long 
but different tradition in international^ law, has been used in international relations.
5 Eight tenets are summarised in J. Flax, 'Postmodernism and Gender Relations', in 
M.R. Malson, J.F. O'Barr, S. Westphal-Wihl and M. Wyer (eds), Feminist Theory in 
Practice and Process. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1986, pp.51-74 at pp.54- 
55.
6 H. Lawson, Reflexivitv: The post-modern predicament. Hutchinson Books, London, 
1985, p.9.
7 Birch, op.cit., p.15.
8 C. Belsey, Critical Practice. Methuen, London, 1980, p.38 and M.J. Shapiro, 'The 
Rhetoric of Social Science: The Political Responsibilities of the Scholar' in J.S. Nelson, 
A. Megill, and D.N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences. University of 
Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin, 1987, pp.363 -380.
9 D. Kellner, Critical Theory. Marxism and Modernity. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1989, 
P-6.
10 In Saussurean theory, 'signifiers' are the sound image or written shape of a 'signified' 
concept - each inseparable from the other: Belsey, op.cit., p.38. Similiarly, 'signifiers' 
in Denrckon thought are moments of speech which order the perceived world: J. Culler, 
On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism. Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, 1982, p.107.
11 R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye Jr, 'Power and Interdependence revisited', International 
Organisation, vol. 41, no.4, 1987, pp.725-753 at p.732, purporting to rebut Susan 
Strange on this point from S. Strange, 'Cave! hie dragones: a critique of regime
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'Regime theory' has been developed primarily by western political scientists over the last 
twenty years. One explanation is that 'regimes' 'emerged' partly in response to the 
perceived inability of mainstream zero-sum, conflict-oriented 'realist' analyses to explain 
the growth of international co-operation and interdependence after World War II, and in 
particular, by realism's alleged failure to explain either the existence of norm-governed 
state behaviour or continuing co-operation after the perceived decline in the power of 
'hegemonic' states, such as the United States and the Soviet Union \ n general, 
'regimes' in political science encompass a broader range of behaviour than do 'regimes' 
under international law.
The emergence of critical analyses of international phenomena and in particular of cyclical 
or universalist theories of history (such as 'realism 'll or 'neorealism' 1 has 
engendered defensive rebuttals^ from the latter theorists which are reminiscent of earlier
analysis', originally printed in International Organisation, vol36, no.2, 1982, later 
reprinted in S. Krasner, International Regimes. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1983, 
pp.337 -354.
12 Krasner, Preface, International Regimes, op.cit., p.viii; R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye 
Jr, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Little, Brown and 
Company, Boston, 1977, Ch. 1; S. Haggard and B.A. Simmons, 'Theories of 
International Regimes', International Organisation, vol.41, no.3, 1987, pp. 491-517.
13 The crudest form of 'realism' is characterised by at least six assumptions, including 
that the international system is anarchic, with states being independent sovereign entities; 
that states are coherent units and the only actors of importance in the international system; 
that inter-state behaviour is zero-sum, with state power exercised in the pursuit of the 
national interest, and that inter-state co-operation balances power and ensures the survival 
of the system: R.L. O'Meara, 'Regimes and Their Implications for International Theory', 
Millenium: Journal of International Studies, vol.13, no.3, 1984, pp.245 -264 at pp.250 - 
253.
14 This 'school' retains the realist focus on states as actors but accords greater primacy to 
economic statecraft. It is exemplified in R. Gilpin, The Politics of International Economic 
R elations. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1987; S.D. Krasner, Structural 
Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism. University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1985.
15 See for example, R.O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics. Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1986.
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conflicts about paradigms^. Such conflict may be inevitable since critical theory 
opposes the notion of grand theory 17 and engages in meta-theorising about 
representations of a 'constructed' 'reality', and in particular, it challenges the foundational 
assumptions of the discipline. Critical theorists also seem to relish their 'dissentient' 
status as scholars 'in exile' and celebrate the identification of 'difference', their asserted 
transgression of 'limits to knowledge' and their undermining of the ways in which 
meaning and order are imposed in more traditional worksl^. Although far from 
celebratory, this sub-thesis also questions familiar 'ways of knowing', and it attempts to 
expose Grotian 'regime' theory to some of the insights provided in works by Derrida and 
Foucault.
(ii) The Structure of the Sub-Thesis
A range of perceptions and analytical approaches evident in critical theorising will be 
applied to a body of works by Professor Joseph Nye J r ^ .  One article by Roger
16 See M. Banks, 'The Inter-paradigm Debate' in M. Light and A.J.R. Groom (eds), 
International Relations: A handbook of current theory. Frances Pinter, London, 1985, 
pp.7-26; M. Hoffman, 'Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate', Millenium: 
Journal of International Studies: vol.16, no.2, 1987, pp.231 -249; H.R. Alker, Jr. and 
T. J. Biersteker, 'The Dialectics of Savoir Faire', International Studies Quarterly, vol.28, 
1984, pp. 121 -142.
17 An exception is exemplified in R.W. Cox, Production. Power and World Order: 
Social Forces in the Making of History. Columbia University Press, New York, 1987.
18 R.K. Ashley and R.B.J. Walker, 'Introduction: Speaking the Language of Exile: 
Dissident Thought in International Studies', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 34, 
1990, pp.259-268.
19 J.S. Nye Jr, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime' in G. H. Quester, Nuclear 
Proliferation: Breaking the Chain. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1981, pp.15- 
38, originally published in International Organisation, vol.35, 1981. Incidental 
references will also be made to J.S. Nye Jr, 'The Transformation of World Power', 
Dialogue, no. 90, 1990, pp.2-7; J.S. Nye Jr, 'The Changing Nature of World Power', 
Political Science Quarterly, vol.105, no.2, 1990, pp.177-192; J.S. Nye Jr, 'Arms 
Control After the Cold War', Foreign Affairs, vol.68, no.5, 1989, pp.42-64; Nye Jr, 
J.S. 'Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security regimes', International Organisation. 
vol.41, no.3, 1987, pp.371-402; J.S. Nye Jr, 'NPT: The Logic of Inequality', Foreign 
Policy, vol.59, 1985, pp.123-131; R.L. O'Meara, 'Regimes and Their Implications for
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Smith^O wiii also be examined, but in less detail. These authors have examined the 
operation of the nuclear non-proliferation 'regime' (hereafter NNPR). The articles have 
been written within the broad framework of recent western 'regime' theory, and although 
there are some significant differences in their analyses, they can be classified broadly as 
'Grotian' 'regime' theorists. This approach will be explained in Chapter 1 and Nye's and 
Smith's views will be summarised.
Professor Nye's texts in particular invite close analysis, as they should be regarded 
highly by virtue of the status of their author. Joseph Nye joined the administration of 
U.S. President Carter following the 1976 election as one of the experts drawn from a 
Ford-Mitre study on nuclear energy^, and he was Deputy to the Under Secretary of 
State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology between 1977 and 1979. He has 
been Professor of Government at Harvard University and Ford Foundation Professor of 
International Security at Harvard University. He is also the author of various texts 
including Power and Interdependence (with R. Keohane) and more recently, Bound to
International Theory', Millenium: Journal of International Studies, vol.13, no.3, 1984, 
pp.245-264; J.S. Nye Jr, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', International 
Organisation, vol.35, 1981; J.S. Nye Jr, 'Non-proliferation: a long term strategy', 
Foreign Affairs, vol.56, 1978, pp.601-623; Nye Jr, J.S. 'United States Policy on 
Nuclear Technology: Combining Energy and Security', United States, Department of 
State Bulletin. May, 1977, pp.550-554; Nye Jr, J.S. 'Planning a Safeguardable Nuclear 
Future' United States, Department of State Bulletin. August, 1977, pp. 183-190; Nye Jr, 
J.S. 'Nuclear Power Without Nuclear Proliferation', United States, Department of State 
Bulletin. November, 1977, pp.666-671; Nye Jr, J.S. 'Nuclear Policy: Balancing 
Nonproliferation and Energy Security', United States, Department of State Bulletin. 
October, 1978, pp.38-42.
20 R.K. Smith, 'Explaining the non-proliferation regime: anomalies for contemporary 
international relations theory', International Organisation, vol.41, no.2, 1987, pp.253- 
281. A recent article: T. McMorris Tate, 'Regime-building in the Non-Proliferation 
System', Journal of Peace Research, vol.27, no.4, 1990, pp. 399 - 414 will not be 
examined in detail. It also focusses on nuclear learning under the NNPR and has some of 
the same flaws as Nye's work in that it focusses on U.S. nuclear export policies. It 
differs however in referring to Euratom briefly and in arguing that national self-interest 
often erodes multilateral, 'learned' co-operation.
21 Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group, Report: Nuclear Power - Issues and Choices.
Keeny Jr., S.M. (chair.), Ballinger Publishing Company, Massachusetts, 1977.
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Lead: The Changing Nature of American Powert  Roger Smith is a PhD candidate in 
the Department of Government at Georgetown University.
These texts are likely to be regarded as authoritative, especially those of Professor Nye. 
Their message has been disseminated widely in academic, public and state fora. As a 
'security expert' and a public figure close to Democrat governments, his views may also 
be seen as a discursive practice: part of a broader discourse of political p o w e r^ . He 
both constitutes part of that discursive practice and is constituted by i t . Professor Nye is 
an active contributor to and the subject of a discourse which portrays the U.S. as an 
'imagined political community'24 - with the U.S. state both the sovereign protector of its 
citizens, and a leading contributor to world 'security'. Much of Professor Nye's writing 
demonstrates a close identification with the policies of that state - a subjectivity which is 
not exclusive or individual, but tends to inhere in those who wield public power. His 
contribution to political discourse, although variable, aids the formation of identities and 
images which found subjectivities and public outlooks, and influences foreign policies 
and decisions, especially within the 'security' elite. Of course competing, opposing 
ideologies, texts and readings also claim their public and private space, but this 'dissent' 
tends not to be regarded as seriously. As a PhD candidate Roger Smith's views are far 
less authoritative, although more persuasive, but since they are published in International 
Organisation this is an early indication of a later 'establishment' status within the 
discipline of international relations. His views are only briefly examined in this paper.
22 Basic Books, New York, 1990.
23 Foucault suggests, in part, that the author's name is not just part of a discourse, but 
performs a 'classificatory function', or is a 'discursive property', conferring status on the 
text. It also facilitates an historical analysis of the text as discourse : M. Foucault, 'What 
is an author', in D. Lodge, Modem Criticism and Theory: A Reader. Longman, London, 
1988, pp. 197-210 at pp.201. On 'security discourse' generally, see: R. Luckham, 
'Armament Culture', A lternatives. vol.X, 1984, pp.1-44; G.M. Dillon, Security and 
Modernity, Typed Manuscript, Department of International Relations, Australian National 
University, Canberra, 1989 and R.B.J. W alker, 'Security, Sovereignty and the 
Challenge of World Politics', Working Paper No. 87, Peace Research Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra, 1990.
24 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism. Verso, London, 1983.
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Although the genesis of texts is ultimately undecidable^S 'deconstruc tion '^  can 
facilitate the recognition of textual 'floor-plans', or the building blocks of theory and 
texts. For Derrida in particular, textual foundations form a 'metaphysics of presence' or 
an order of meaning (logocentrism) which rationalises and simplifies messy realities by 
imposing hierarchies and drawing comparisons, creating sovereign actors and by 
privileging selected ev en ts^ . 'Deconstruction' can also demonstrate the use of rhetoric 
as a means towards the identification of binary oppositions, and enable the reversal and 
displacement of hierarchical oppositions in texts. In this paper the indeterminate meaning 
of the words in the text will not be focussed on, nor their derivatives 'traced'28. Rather, 
other deconstructive ideas and techniques will be adapted. In particular, inter-textuality is 
emphasised through the demonstration of my reading of the texts in the light of other read 
t e x t s ^ .  Repressed and marginalised data will be drawn upon to embarrass the 
generalising claims of hegemonic discourses.
25 K. Hart, The Trespass of the Sign. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989,
p.110.
26 Deconstruction is associated mainly with Derrida's approach in Of Grammatologv 
where he exposes contradictions in the text and the various meanings the text may 
convey, irrespective of authorial intention. It is an 'activity of reading' which usually 
attempts to 'implode' the text through the identification of textual hierarchies and their 
reversal; the identification of arguments that 'undo themselves' and the identification of 
privileged and excluded aspects of texts: Culler, op.cit., especially Chapter Two; J.M. 
Balkin, 'Deconstructive practice and Legal Theory', TheYale Law Journal, vol.96, 1987 
pp. 743-786.
27 Culler, op.cit., pp.92-94, 151-155; R.K. Ashley, 'Living on Border - Lines: Man, 
P ostructuralism  and W ar', in J. Der Derian and M .J. Shapiro (eds), 
International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics. Lexington 
Books, M assachusetts, 1989, pp.259-321 at p.261-264. Logocentrism is an 
interpretative discourse said to be associated with 'modernity', that is, faith in 'objective' 
external referents in 'reality', 'reason' and secular power. 'Modernity' became dominant 
with the decline of religion and the rise of the secular state: G.M. Dillon, 'Security and 
Modernity', Typed M anuscript. Department of International Relations, Australian 
National University, Canberra, 1989.
28 Birch, op.cit., p.8.
29 A.Jefferson and D. Robey (eds), Modern Literary Theory. Second Edition, B.T. 
Batsford, London, 1986, pp. 109-111.
8 .
It will be argued in this sub-thesis primarily that Nye's and Smith's texts reproduce a 
particular discursive formation - that of a constructed U.S. dominance in the maintenance 
of the NNPR. In many of Nye's articles, the U.S. was argued to be dominant both in the 
regime's formation and maintenance, but for Smith only in its maintenance. This 
'constructed' dominance has also been evident generally in the academic field of 
international relations until recently^. This is important to recognise since although 
particular U.S. non-proliferation policies may be seen as highly desirable, the extent to 
which the U.S. can or has secured compliance with its norms and policy prescriptions 
may be overstated in these texts^ 1, and that 'textual priority' can be reversed under 
'deconstruction'32 to emphasise the role of the non-superpower, and in particular the 
non-aligned states.
Chapter 1 of the sub-thesis will outline the theoretical framework of Nye's and Smith's 
articles - broadly that of liberal western 'regime' theory - and it will summarise the 
differing arguments made by both authors concerning the content, formation, 
maintenance and prospects for the regime. Chapter 2 will be an identification of selected 
'logocentric' aspects of the texts, drawing on but adapting Derridean theory through the 
use of 'inter-textual' material such as other 'historical' representations of aspects of the 
regime. 'Logocentricity' be shown to be present in the authors' views about regime 
formation (Nye), regime maintenance (Nye and Smith), and in particular, in their 
assessment of the importance of doctrines of nuclear deterrence, nuclear learning and 
threats to the NNPR. It will also critically assess the emphases that the authors give to 
various aspects of the regime, or their textual 'enframing' practices, and in particular their 
lack of analysis of U.S. sanctions policy and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(hereafter Euratom). It will also assess the implications of that omission. Chapter 3 will
30 V. Kulbalkova and A.A. Cruikshank, 'The Study of International Relations in the 
South Pacific', Australian Outlook, vol.41, no.2, 1987, pp. 110-129; M. Hoffman, 'An 
American Social Science : International Relations', Daedulus. vol.106, no.3, 1977, pp. 
41-60; S. Smith, 'Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of 
International Relations as a Social Science', in H.C. Dyer and L. Mangasarian (eds), The 
Study of International Relations: The State of the Art. MacMillan, in association with 
Millenium: Journal of International Studies. London, 1989. But other contributors in 
Dyer and Mangasarian suggest that the discipline's ethnocentricity is waning.
31 Similar arguments with a different case-study can be found in R. Higgott, 'Towards a 
Non-Hegemonic International Political Economy: An Antidopean Perspective', Working 
Paper No. 97, Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1990.
32 Culler, op.cit., pp.85-86.
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examine less central criticisms of the texts, again drawing on critical theory. It will 
highlight contradictions within the authors' texts regarding the possession of nuclear 
weaponry, their possibly 'Orientalist' assumptions about the implications of horizontal 
proliferation, their use of pro-nuclear language, and finally the limits of their 
predominantly 'state as main actor' approach. It will attempt to identify ideological and 
conceptual values to show how terms have been restricted in their meaning or tied to 
particular operations within the text so as to embed in it a conceptual hierarchy. The final 
chapter will highlight the extent to which Nye and Smith's texts provide a sound basis for 
predicting the future of the 'regime', and some comments will be made about possible 
developments towards 1995. In that year the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
will have its twenty-five year review. Under NPT Article X, twenty-five years after the 
treaty has entered into force a conference shall be held to determine for how long, if at all, 
the Treaty should be extended.
10.
CHAPTER 1
THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION 'REGIME'
The chapter will outline very briefly the elements of 'regime' theory and it will summarise 
what Nye and Smith regard as the important legal instruments and norms of the regime. 
It will also examine their views on knowledge and learning; the role, if any, of hegemony 
in formation of the NNPR, and their assessment of how the regime has been maintained. 
Finally, some prospects for the regime will be extrapolated from their views.
(i) Theoretical Framework: 'Regime' Theory
'Regimes' within western liberal theories of international relations are generally defined 
as the set of implicit or explicit 'principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area'33, and 'the set of rules, 
norms and procedures that regulate behaviour and control its effects in international 
affairs'34. Although usually applied to multilateral co-operation, occasionally the
33 Smith, op.cit., p.253. This is the definition propounded by Stephen Krasner, which 
tends to have the greatest following: S.D. Krasner, 'Structural causes and regime 
consequences: regimes as intervening variables', in Krasner, International Regimes, 
op.cit., pp. 1-21 at p .l; initially published in International Organisation vol.36, no.2, 
1982. Nye also adopts this definition: Nye, 'Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security 
regimes', op.cit., p.374. On 'regimes' generally see also R.L. O'Meara, 'Regimes and 
Their Implications for International Theory', Millenium: Journal of International 
Studies.vol.13. no.3, 1984, pp. 245-264; O.R. Young, 'International Regimes', W orld 
Politics, vol.39, 1986, pp. 104-122; J.N. Rosenau, 'Before Co-operation: Hegemons, 
Regimes and Habit-Driven Actors in World Politics', International Organisation, vol.40, 
no.4, 1986, pp. 849-894, and M.A. Tetreault, 'Regimes and Liberal World Orders', 
Alternatives. vol.XIII, 1988, pp. 5-26.
34 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.16. or alternative definitions 
which will not be discussed here, see S. Haggard and B.A. Simmons, 'Theories of 
International Regimes', (1987) 41(3) International Organisation vol. 41, no.3, pp. 491- 
517 at p.498.
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concept of 'regime' is applied to bilateral relations^ and to empires^6. Both Nye and 
Smith describe international co-operation over nuclear technology as a 'regime'.
Varieties of 'regime theory' include Burton's 'world society' m o d e l t  structural, game- 
theoretic, functional, and cognitive^ 8 approaches, or under another classifying scheme - 
structural, modified structural and Grotian approaches. These differing approaches are 
examined in the leading text on 'regimes'39. Susan Strange, a leading critic of 
Grotian^O regime theory, has been identified with the 'structural' positional; Keohane 
and Stein with the more game-theoretic 'modified structural realism'42? while Joseph 
Nye Jr and Roger Smith would probably not object to being identified with the more 
realist end of the Grotian tradition^.
Within the Grotian tradition, regimes are said to become either 'intervening variables' in 
the international order, assuming a life of their own, independent of fluctuations in the 
power exercised by states in the international system, or 'interactive variables', feeding 
back into states' assessments of their interests^ by 'increasing transaction flows, 
facilitating knowledge and understanding, and creating property rights'45, States 
involved in regimes are said to perceive that by some short or long term calculation of
35 Nye, 'Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security regimes', op.cit. and see Krasner, 
'Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables', op.cit., 
P-8.
36 Tetreault, op.cit.
37 O'Meara, op.cit.
38 Haggard and Simmons, op.cit.
39 Krasner, op.cit.
40 Krasner, 'Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening 
variables', op.cit., pp.l, 7, 9.
41 ibid., pp.6-7.
42 ibid., pp.7-8.
43 Alongside Raymond Hopkins, Donald Puchala and Oran Young: ibid., pp.8-10.
44 Krasner, 'Regimes and the limits of realism: regimes as autonomous variables', in 
Krasner, op.cit., p.358.
43 ibid., p.362.
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their interest, that co-operative behaviour is preferable to unilateral behaviour. 
'Hegemons' or 'superpowers' under 'regime' theory are said to encompass some 
responsibility for providing a 'public good' in the shape of international order. Thus 
regimes are thought to constrain states' short-range self-interest and to contour long-term 
policies, with regime injunctions being the focal point around which actors' interests 
converge^ . The internalisation of norms and the redefinition of interests is said to 
occur through 'learning' - a factor which is being cited increasingly as a cogent 
explanation for regime formation and m aintenance^.
Professor Nye argues that this learning can have various effects. If regime principles 
and norms are internalised by states or important domestic coalitions, the costs of 
defecting are raised. Information can also change perceptions of self-interest held by 
states. National bureaucracies can change procedures because of the existence of regimes; 
subnational actors and third parties may have new coalition opportunities; attitudes can be 
changed, and regular meetings may keep other changes in the political relationship distant 
from the re g im e ^ . However, regimes are thought likely to rupture should a great 
disparity develop between the power of the hegemonic state responsible for the creation 
of the regime and the regim e^.
(ii) Nye and Smith on the NNPR
In summary, Professor Nye argues that the NNPR owes much to the realisation by the 
United States and the Soviet Union that nuclear technology had become an escaped genie, 
and that its peaceful applications ought to be widely available but controlled. The NNPR 
was constructed largely under U.S. hegemony. It was also made possible by U.S. and 
Soviet 'learning' to co-operate, a point which is discussed below. With the relative 
decline in power of the U.S. the maintenance of the regime has become difficult, because 
of the ability of nuclear suppliers to undercut U.S. restrictive policies, but to date the 
U.S. has managed to share the management burden among like-minded states, partly
46 ibid., p.399.
47 G. Modelski, 'Is World Politics Evolutionary Learning?', International Organisation 
vol.44, no.l, 1990, pp.1-24; Keohane and Nye, 'Power and Interdependence Revisited', 
op.cit., especially at pp. 749-752.
48 Nye, 'Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security regimes', op.cit., p.400.
49 Krasner, 'Regimes and the limits of realism: regimes as autonomous variables', 
op.cit., p.357.
13.
because of the lessons they havelearned under the regime. Roger Smith argues that the 
NNPR is not attributable to any hegemony, but to the convergent views of various states 
that the possession of nuclear weaponry was undesirable. Thus according to Smith, 
learning preceded the formation of the regime, while for Nye learning followed the 
internalisation of norms sponsored by the superpowers. In contrast to the school of 
regime theorists which sees disorder in the wake of 'hegemonic -decline', Smith argues 
that the NNPR was significantly strengthened in the nineteen-seventies. For Smith, the 
regime seems to have given institutional form to pre-existing shared norms. These 
differing views, which partly affirm U.S. policy prescriptions, will be elaborated in this 
chapter.
14.
(a) Legal Instruments
For both Smith and Nye, the NNPR comprises an array of domestic and international 
legal regulations and institutions, including various international treaties, detailed below. 
Nye states:
For nonproliferation, the main regime norms and practices are found in the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its regional counterparts like the Treaty 
of Tlatelolco; the safeguards, rules and procedures of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as in various UN resolutions^.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (hereafter IAEA) is the most important 
institution, for both, while the most important treaty is the NPT of 1968. Other important 
'regime' rules and decision-making procedures include domestic legislation regulating 
nuclear exports and financial assistance, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the 
International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Committee (hereafter INFCE).
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is rightly regarded as the most successful arms 
control treaty in existence. It is a central part of the NNPR and has about 141 members. 
Its key objectives are to limit 'horizontal' nuclear weapons proliferation beyond the five 
declared nuclear-weapon states recognised in 1968 (hereafter NWS: then the United 
States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China); to facilitate the peaceful 
applications of nuclear technology, and to encourage 'vertical' disarmament, although 
this latter aim does not feature in most of Nye and Smith's work. Professor Nye 
describes the NPT as a 'relatively simple treaty' which, under the first two articles, aims 
to prevent the transfer or acceptance, of assistance for, or the development of, nuclear 
weaponry or explosives, in non-nuclear-weapon states (hereafter NNWS). NNWS are 
required to enter into nuclear safeguards agreements with the IAEA and to put their 
nuclear facilities under safeguards under Article III and preambular paragraphs four and 
five, while under the fourth and fifth Articles, and preambular paragraphs six and seven 
they are promised access to technology and to the benefits of peaceful nuclear 
explosions. Under Article VI and preambular paragraphs eight to twelve, NWS should 
seriously continue negotiations toward ending the arms race and concluding a 
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT), attaining nuclear disarmament, and 
towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
50 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p. 16; Nye, 'Nuclear learning 
and U.S.-Soviet security regimes', op.cit., p.399 but there reference is also made to the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group.
15.
These latter obligations were secured as a compromise to balance NNWS obligations 
under the NPT^ 1.
In the next chapter, the prioritising and emphasising of some of these regime instruments 
will be examined. Euratom and U.S. sanctions policies are barely noted by either Nye or 
Smith, when they are both significant and deserve critical analysis. In addition, the 
distortion in favour of U.S. policy prescriptions will be demonstrated: for Nye regarding 
regime formation and maintenance, and for Smith regarding regime maintenance.
(b) Central Norms
For both Nye and Smith, a central norm of the NNPR is a concern for the 'stability' of 
the nuclear order, with the regime being designed to prevent a destabilising rush for 
nuclear weapons. Nye suggests that the NPT in particular, maintains a presumption 
against proliferation^ and suggests that this presumption derives from the success of 
the doctrine of nuclear deterrence^. This alleged 'stability' of the international nuclear 
order under deterrence will be examined in the next chapter.
For both, the IAEA is central, with Nye suggesting that its international 'safeguards' and 
institutional framework were central to the 'basic bargain' of the regime, which was 
assistance to countries 'in their peaceful nuclear energy needs in return for their accepting 
the intrusion of safeguards and inspection'54. it does not matter for Nye that the regime 
has not prevented all proliferation, rather the political breathing space which it has created 
in slowing proliferation has allowed time for the developm ent of 'political 
settlem ents'^ . The fact that nuclear assistance today may add little to the attractiveness 
of participation in the regime does not detract from the importance of that during 
negotiations.
51 ibid., p.18.
52 Nye,'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p. 16; Nye , 'Nuclear learning 
and U.S.-Soviet security regimes', op.cit., at pp. 396-7; Smith, op.cit., pp. 257 -258.
53 Nye, 'Nuclear Policy: The U.S. Approach to Nonproliferation - Are We Making 
Progress?', op.cit., p.40; also Nye, 'NPT: The Logic of Inequality', op.cit., p.126.
54 Nye,'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.17.
55 Nye, 'Arms Control After the Cold War', op.cit. pp.44-47, 60; Nye, 'Maintaining a 
Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit. p.36; Nye, 'Nuclear Policy: The U.S. Approach to 
Nonproliferation - Are We Making Progress?', op.cit., p.39.
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Both Nye and Smith concentrate in most articles on the aim of slowing proliferation 
rather than on the treaty aim of encouraging disarmament negotiation. Nye for example 
describes as the NPT's 'key injunctions' - the slowing of the spread of weapons-usable 
technologies and the placing of non-proliferation concerns before political advantage with 
allies or third parties^6. However, U.S. relations with its allies Pakistan and Israel, 
which serve to dilute this argument, will be discussed in Chapter 2. Both authors 
endorse other implicit NNPR norms such as regulated uranium mining and export and the 
global 'development' paradigm^ 7 which advocate the use of sophisticated high 
technology such as nuclear power. Nye'sand Smith's portrayal of the role of the U.S. 
'Atoms for Peace' program and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as central to the 
dissemination of nuclear technology under 'safeguards', will be critically examined in 
Chapter 3.
Smith also sees the 'basic bargain' of the NPT as the extraction by the NNWS of a 
commitment from nuclear powers that nuclear technology would be commercially 
available, and that the vertical proliferation of nuclear arms would be controlled and 
eventually eliminated. But neither Smith nor Nye assert as a central obligation that 
nuclear weapon states negotiate seriously 'in good faith' towards ending nuclear testing 
and disarmament as agreed in the NPT preambular paragraphs and in Article VI. The 
latter is now important to the ease with which the survival of the NPT beyond 1995 can 
be secured, but it is not central in the 'nuclear regime' literature.
For Smith a 'tacit agreement' also underlay the NPT : that NWS would sustain 'a robust 
and expanding international economy and a system of relative free trade in conventional 
weaponry'5 8. The recipients of nuclear technology in turn were required to renounce 
the development of nuclear weaponry and agree to international safeguards over their 
nuclear programs. Smith recognises that the 'implicit bargain' that conventional 
weaponry would be readily available to NNWS has enabled the acquisition by NNWS of 
sophisticated delivery systems capable of carrying nuclear weapons should they decide to 
'go nuclear'^9, as has occurred with Israel. Smith does not critically examine the failure
56 Nye, 'Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security regimes', op.cit., p.396.
57 Explored in M. Kaldor, 'The Global Political Economy', Alternatives. vol.XI, 1986, 
pp. 431-460 at p.441.
58 Smith, op. cit., p.258.
59 ibid., p.258. This is examined in G. Milhollin, 'India's missiles - with a little help 
from our friends', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol.45, no.9, 1989, pp.31 -35.
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of that 'bargain' to halt horizontal proliferation by the U.S. allies Israel and Pakistan 
except with a footnote reference to Leonard Spector's work^O,
(c) Knowledge and Learning
Smith sees the NNPR as a security regime and cites compliance with various criteria 
outlined by Jervis^ 1, which are noted below, but like Nye, he also argues that it is 
preferable to follow Haas^2 in arguing that knowledge and learning about nuclear issues 
must be accounted for as factors in multilateral co-operation. Haas has developed the 
view that when actors learn about, and agree on technical information and its theoretical 
implications, that consensual policies, even amongst ideological adversaries, can 
result^ . Nye states that:
....  [International norms, (which) interact with domestic politics of the
states in an international system so that they transform states' definitions of 
their interests. Transnational and interstate interactions and norms lead to 
new perceptions of interests and new coalition possibilities for different 
interests within states^.
Smith concludes that '[T]he knowledge of what effect nuclear weapons could have on the 
international system was so "startling different" (sic) that the new "skill" of waging 
nuclear war pushed states toward the formation of new habit (sic)65'. Smith suggests 
that at the formation of the NNPR a number of states had already decided to forego 
nuclear weaponry, having learned what effects they had, and that therefore the NNPR 
was agreed 'on the basis of cognitive developments based on consensual knowledge 
linked to an agreed social goal'66, not because of hegemon-sponsored norms. Smith
60 Smith, op.cit., p.260, fn.20.
61 ibid., p.260.
62 E. B. Haas, 'Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes', World 
Politics, vol.32, 1980, pp. 357 - 405 at p.390.
63 ibid., pp.367 -8
64 Nye,'Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security regimes', op.cit., p.372.
65 Smith, op.cit., p.277.
66 Quoting Haas, op.cit., p. 372, in R. Smith, op.cit., p.278.
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suggests, therefore, that the regime developed after a number of states with anti-nuclear 
policies agreed to form the NPT.
Nye recently has also argued that both the Soviet Union and the United States learnt that 
their nuclear export policies could not restrict recipients to peaceful applications in the 
nineteen-fifties and nineteen-sixties and that after the failure of unilaterally restrictive 
policies, they turned to co-operative solutions*^. There he also uses the concepts of 
knowledge and learning to explain significant decisions made by regime members, 
suggesting that both superpowers modified their short and long run self-interest because 
of the success of the regim e^.
In the next chapter this concept of 'nuclear learning' will be examined. It will be argued 
that Smith may be right in suggesting that the NNPR was formed after many states 
learned of the adverse effects of nuclear weaponry, but these were primarily the non- 
aligned states who badgered the superpowers into agreeing to the NPT. The domestic 
and transnational politics accompanying so-called 'nuclear learning' are complex and 
varying phenomena which warrant better analysis than is present in either Nye'sor Smith's 
articles, as will be demonstrated. Moreover, by 're-historicising' the formation of the 
regime, Nye's views on 'learning' appear wanting in that the role of smaller states is 
wrongly marginalised, while Smith's are more persuasive. With regard to the 
maintenance of the regime, Nye also suggests that the Soviet Union learnt to forego 
certain political advantages so as not to jeopardise the regime, but the U.S. did not 
apparently 'learn' from the Soviet Union. Although neither author claims to forecast the 
future of the regime, nor explores the implications of 'nuclear learning' for the nineteen- 
nineties, some comments will be made in that regard in the concluding section of this sub­
thesis.
(d) 'Hegemony' in Regime Formation
Nye and Smith differ on the question of the formation of the regime. Nye's most recent 
writings modify the theme developed in Power and Interdependence - that regimes reflect 
both the structural distribution of power within the international system, as well as the 
outcome of the political bargaining process within that system*^. jn one article Nye
67 Nye, 'Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security regimes', op.cit., pp. 383, 391; 
Nye, 'U.S.- Soviet Cooperation in a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.336.
68 Nye, 'Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security regimes', op.cit., p.392.
69 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, op.cit.,
pp. 20-21.
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suggests that the regime is indebted to superpower hegemony, and that although regime 
'stability' became problematic with the decline of U.S. nuclear power, the U.S. 
successfully rallied international support for the regim e^. Nye is now focussing more 
on the 'learning' encouraged by regimes : he suggests that the regime was formed when 
both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. redefined their interests, or 'learnt' from their initial failures 
in nonproliferation policy^ U The superpowers turned to co-operative solutions at a 
particular historical juncture, when detente prevailed^  after both abandoned unilateral 
restrictive policies as unsuccessful. Alliances and bi-polarity were weakening, the Soviet 
Union had difficulties with restraining China's nuclear ambitions and the U.S. had failed 
in its attempt to balance its nonproliferation policy with the sharing of the operational 
control of nuclear deterrence with its allies"^. Co-operation was made possible by the 
detente in bilateral superpower relations from the mid-nineteen-sixties^^.
Smith argues that 'the system of international cooperation over non-proliferation ... 
presents a serious anomaly for contemporary international relations theory in explaining 
both its formation and maintenance, despite recent modifications'.^ He argues that at 
the time of the formation of the NNPR the U.S. was no longer a 'hegemon' within the 
meaning of the theory, and further, that: 'The development of the nuclear non­
proliferation regime reverses every core proposition for the theory of hegemonic 
stability'76. Smith contends that the NNPR was institutionalised as the U.S. entered a 
period of overall economic decline, growing more effective as the U.S. dropped its 
market share in nuclear energy from nearly one hundred per cent in the late nineteen- 
sixties to thirty-five per cent by the late nineteen-seventies^. He also cites other
70 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit.
71 Nye, 'U.S.- Soviet Co-operation in a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.337.
72 ibid., p.343.
73ibid., p.337-9.
74 ibid, p.343.
75 Smith, op.cit., p.255.
76 ibid., p.268.
77 Smith does not canvass the overall debate about whether the U.S. is in decline. See 
for example: J.E. Garten, 'Is American Decline Inevitable?', World Policy Journal. 
Winter, 1987-88, pp. 151-174; B. Russett, 'The mysterious case of vanishing
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indicators of the erosion of U.S. economic and military power, and argues that although 
the co-operation of Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea in the NNPR might be due 
to U.S. defense involvement, this cannot explain the cooperation of the Soviet Union, 
Sweden, India (sic), and the rest of the Third World^S in the regime. He argues that the 
NPT was developed around 'convergent expectations prior to any well-developed pattern 
of interaction' between states on that is su e d
In addition to the factor of 'knowledge and learning' noted above Smith also suggests, 
following Jervis, that the regime also involved rational actor considerations^ of the 
'security dilemma', especially offensive/defensive considerations. Smith also suggests 
that other 'preconditions' set by Jervis are satisfied: that a highly destructive and 
prolonged war preceded the regime, and actors believed that the value they placed on 
security co-operation was shared by other states; all major actors accepted the status quo, 
and war and the individual pursuit of security were seen as more costly than co-operative 
action. It will be argued in Chapter 2 however, that this is too neat and utilitarian a 
picture, and that the non-aligned states did not accept the status quo. Their stated interest 
was in nuclear disarmament, not the maintenance of the nuclear order. These security 
considerations may also not have been paramount in the late nineteen-sixties and early 
nineteen-seventies when many newly independent states may have regarded the NNPR 
more as a nuclear trade instrument which offered the possibility of energy, medicinal and 
agricultural development aid.
Unlike Nye, Smith argues that the U.S. nuclear trade and aid program - the Atoms for 
Peace Program (which is discussed in Chapter 3), only provided an outline for a possible 
regime, and that the NNPR was not institutionalised until after the negotiation of the 
NPT. He argues that the essence of an effective 'regime' is an 'injunction', unexplained 
in his text, of which there were none in the Atoms for Peace Program, and he correctly 
a rgues that proliferation was most rampant during the Atoms for Peace period. Smith 
also argues that the U.S. supported the NNPR because it saw the futility of a strategy of
hegemony: or, Is Mark Twain really dead?', International Organisation, vol. 39, no.2, 
1985, pp.207-231.
78 Smith, op.cit, p.272. India is not a member of the NPT however, and its programs 
for general and complete disarmament have not yet gained much international support.
79 ibid., p.277.
80 ibid., pp.260 -262.
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denial, it sought to reduce alliance tensions and to increase commercial opportunities, and 
thought that nuclear commerce could benefit the U.S. in the superpower arms race^l.
Thus, in essence, Nye argues for a 'hegemonic regime', and Smith argues for a 
consensus-based regime, and to some extent they interpret the nature and outcome of the 
learning process differently.
(e) Regime Maintenance
Both Smith and Nye argue that in the early nineteen-seventies the 'regime' was threatened 
by the Indian nuclear explosion, the oil embargo, oil price increases and exaggerated 
expectations for the nuclear industry^ . it was aiso threatened by the increased number 
of nuclear suppliers in the depressed nuclear market and the existence of buyers with 
incentives to proliferate, and by the 'proposed sale of facilities for producing weapons- 
usable materials without regard to their economic justification or proliferation 
implications', notably by France and Germany^3. For Nye, these developments were 
exacerbated by a decline in U.S. nuclear power, with a rise in competition from the sale 
of European light-water reactors and the erosion of the U.S. near- monopoly in 
enrichment services^. The decline of U.S. pre-eminence in the nuclear area was also 
accompanied with the 'credibility decline' of U.S. security guarantees in former client 
states, particularly in Asia, following U.S. defeat in the Vietnam war. But Nye argues 
that U.S. policies were able to accommodate these challenges successfully, and that the 
diffusion of power in the nineteen-seventies may have strengthened incentives for most 
members to maintain the reg im e^ .
The U.S. response to a perceived erosion of the NNPR, for both Nye and Smith, was to 
institute a number of policies to refurbish and stabilise the regime, without coercion or 
discrimination, especially in relation to its most vulnerable aspect - the fuel 'cycle'86.
81 ibid., p.267.
82 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.19.
83 ibid., p.19, Smith, p.270; Nye, 'U.S.-Soviet Co-operation in a Nonproliferation 
Regime', op.cit., p.350.
84 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.20.
85 Nye, 'U.S.-Soviet Co-operation in a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.350.
86 This is seen by some as a misleading term as it connotes a natural event, a cycle for 
fuel, when nuclear energy is in fact heavily dependant on technological intervention.
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These initiatives were the formation of the London Nuclear Suppliers Group, deferral of 
commercial reprocessing and recycling by the Ford and especially the Carter 
administrations, and the establishment of the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation 
Committee (hereafter INFCE)87 in 1977. Nye maintains that the INFCE was generally 
successful in broadening support for basic nonproliferation objectives, but less so in 
respect of a proposed international fuel bank and in alleviating Japanese and French 
concerns particularly regarding permission for reprocessing U.S. origin spent fuel.
In conclusion, Nye states:
Given the natural decline in American preponderance in the nuclear issue 
area, it was important that the burden of leadership in regime maintenance be 
more broadly shared. To a considerable extent, INFCE and the other 
initiatives of the late 1970s helped to accomplish this spreading of the 
burden. The United States helped others to share its agenda....
...But collective leadership is difficult to manage. The United States still has 
to adjust to sharing the process.88
Nye's views on INFCE will be deconstructed in Chapter 2. Although predicated on the 
concept of hegemonic international management, Nye's argument does not really accord 
with those within the state-centric and realist 'hegemon stability' school of regime 
analysis, such as those of Stephen Krasner and Robert Gilpin, who argue that regimes 
developed under the seigniorage of a hegemonic state are more stable under that 
hegemony, and may degenerate into disorder as the hegemon declines^ 9 0r as there are
87 INFCE was a technical and analytical study of all aspects of the nuclear fuel 'cycle' 
convened by the Carter administration. It was organised in eight working groups which 
each examined an aspects of nuclear energy production.
88 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit. p.37.
89 Young, 'Regime dynamics: the rise and fall of international regimes' in Krasner, 
International Regimes, op.cit., pp.93 -113 at pp. 108-9. See also, for example, R.O. 
Keohane, 'The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic 
Regimes, 1967-77', in Ole R. Holsti et al., Changes in the International System. 
Westview, Boulder, 1980 cited in Krasner, 'Structural causes and regime consequences: 
regimes as intervening variables', op. cit., p. 15; P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the 
Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. Fontana 
Press, London,1988; L. Cahn, 'National Power and International Regimes: The United
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changes in political, economic or social environm ents^, although he does suggest that 
the policing of norms is more effective under superpower hegemony 9 1. Another view: 
that "[p]ast patterns of institutionalized cooperation may be able to compensate, to some 
extent, for increasing fragmentation of power'92? js closer to Nyesand Smith's more 
recent focus on 'learning'.
States and International Commodity Markets', Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1980 
cited in R.O. Keohane, 'The demand for international regimes', in Krasner, International 
R egim es, op.cit., pp.141 - 171 at p.142, fn. 1; Smith, op. cit., p.254; Gilpin, U.S. 
Power: Politics of International Economic Relations. Kindleberger, The World in 
Depression: Kindleberger, 'Systems of International Economic Organization', Krasner, 
'State Power' cited in C. Lipson, 'The transformation of trade: the sources and effects of 
regime change' in Krasner, International Regimes, op.cit., pp.233-271 at p.253. Similar 
arguments have been raised by international lawyers. See for example W.G. Grewe, 
Epochen der Volkerrechtsgeschichte. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Baden-Baden, 1984 
discussed in E.McWhinney, 'The Need for a New General Theory of International Law', 
The Canadian Yearbook of International Law, vol.23, 1985, pp.311-324 at 314-317. 
Others argue conversely, that hegemonic decline can strengthen regimes because there are 
greater incentives for collaboration when the collective goods are no longer provided by 
the hegemon: A.A.Stein, 'Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world' 
in Krasner, International Regimes, op.cit., pp.115 -140 at p.132.
90 For example technological developments; cultural change or ecological limitations: 
Young, 'Regime dynamics: the rise and fall of international regimes' op.cit., pp.107, 
110, 113.
91 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p. 37 .
92 Keohane, 'The demand for international regimes', op. cit., p.170. This 'model' has 
been partially affirmed in relation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the 
operation of the International Monetary Fund where some decline in U.S. trading power 
allegedly has resulted in an increase in protectionism and decline in rule adherence, 
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(f) Performance and Prospects
As to the overall performance of the 'regime', both Smith and Nye conclude that it has 
worked successfully to date primarily because nuclear trade has been tightly controlled, 
horizontal proliferation has been slower than it might otherwise have been, and because 
large numbers of countries have publicly eschewed nuclear weapons^. Both refer to 
the 'paradox' of nonproliferation policy whereby a reduction in vertical proliferation^ 
could destabilise the NNPR and 'reduce the sense of security that permits allied states to 
foreswear proliferation'. Nye suggests that deterrence at high levels of weaponry has 
produced 'prudence' in the U.S.-Soviet superpower relationship and that extended 
deterrence has prevented the development of nuclear weaponry elsewhere. He has 
suggested that the 'security guarantees' provided by the U.S. to its allies have been seen 
by both as its strongest nonproliferation policy instrument^. For Nye, horizontal 
proliferation is far more likely to lead to the use of nuclear weapons than 'the introduction 
of an additional thousand each by the United States and the Soviet Union^^'.
In Chapter 2 the question of security guarantees under the NNPR and outside it, and the 
relevance of 'extended deterrence' to member states will be examined. In Chapter 3 the 
'Orientalist' assumptions of this argument will be examined, and some theoretical 
implications of recent U.S. policy towards Iraq will be raised.
More recently Nye has argued that regimes may help to preserve international co­
operation in the issue area of the regime, such as nuclear co-operation, if the bilateral or 
multilateral relationship outside of that issue-area sours^^. He recognises however, that 
the NNPR should now be strengthened by stronger regional initiatives and through the 
development of a complementary regime to control ballistic missile technology^. Nye in
93 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.15; Nye, 'NPT: The Logic 
of Inequality', op. cit., p.123.
94 Nye,'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.35.
95 Nye, 'Nuclear Policy: The U.S. Approach to Nonproliferation - Are We Making 
Progress?', op.cit., p.40; also Nye, 'NPT: The Logic of Inequality', op.cit., p.126.
96 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.35; Nye, 'NPT: The Logic 
of Inequality', op.cit., p.128.
97 Nye, 'U.S. -Soviet Co-operation in a Nonproliferation Regime.', op.cit., p.347.
98 Nye, 'Arms Control After the Cold War', op.cit., p.61.
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particular suggests that the NNPR has been a 'modest success' and that there is a need to 
preserve its operation, as states, and particularly those with tense regional relations, 
perceive that their security would be diminished without
Smith's arguments that the NNPR has strengthened in recent years despite the decline in 
power of the U.S. can be partly sustained. The London Suppliers Group in f CE 
and U.S. legislation have strengthened the regime from the suppliers' point of view but 
have generated some concerns on the part of the neutral and less developed states about 
alleged supplier cartelisation, alleged uranium price rigging, and discriminatory 
obligations under the NNPR, in that the 'guaranteed' supply of nuclear technology for 
peaceful purposes is alleged to be jeopardised. But at the recent fourth NPT review 
conference, trade restrictions under the regime were broadly affirmed. The conference 
urged all supplier states to abide by the 'Zangger Committee' trigger list, defined below, 
when exporting to non-nuclear-weapon states not party to the NPT, thereby indicating a 
consensual strengthening of this aspect of the 'regime'. The limits of the 'safeguards' 
administered by the IAEA will be examined in Chapter 3.
99 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.37.
100 Delegates from the U.S., U.S.S.R., Britain, France, Canada, Germany and Japan 
met at the U.S. Embassy in London in autumn 1974 and drew up a list of sensitive 
technology which could not be exported unless safeguarded. The 'London Club' or 
'London Suppliers Club' was officially recognised in 1975: M. Stephenson and J. Weal, 
Nuclear Dictionary. Longman Group Limited, London, 1985, p.175.
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CHAPTER 2
POWER AND HEGEMONY IN THE NNPR
In this chapter an examination will be made of the way power and hegemony are 
constructed in Nye and Smith's texts. It will be shown that their narrative structure is 
super-power centric, and in particular U.S.- centric. The theoretical implications of 
superpower-centricity will be explored first, and parallels will be drawn between critical 
and Grotian theorising. The explicit and implicit 'hegemony' will be deconstructed. It 
will be argued that the texts primarily reflect the priorities and concerns of the U.S.. Nye 
does this quite overtly and consistently. His argument that the U.S. continues to exercise 
sufficient power to shape international agendas 101 and that it has more of this co-optive 
power than other states also permeates his writings on the NNPR. Nye's theoretical 
reliance on 'learning' is also examined.
While Smith does acknowledge the role of non-hegemonic, smaller states in the formation 
of the regime, in examining its maintenance he ignores the agenda of the non-aligned and 
less developed states in relation to disarmament and nuclear trade concerns. The views of 
the U.S. and its western allies dominate his text, but this is implicit rather than overt.
Super-power-centricity is also reflected in the boundaries drawn by both authors to 
delineate the regime and to prioritise its constituent elements. U.S. sanctions policy and 
Euratom, for example, are problematic within the regime, but are not examined in detail in 
the texts. I am not suggesting however, that similarly skewed analyses are not presented 
by international relations scholars of other nationalities - Soviet-centricity for example, 
may be common in Soviet writings 102 However, super-power-centricity shows that 
the policies and institutions valued by the U.S. are selectively examined, while those 
which undercut U.S. 'hegemony' are marginalised and de-emphasised. This in effect 
prioritises U.S. concerns. In keeping with Derridean re-ordering, in this paper footnote 
'asides' will be elevated to substantial textual concerns.
101 Nye states th a t: 'An important aspect of power is the ability to structure a situation so 
that other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with 
one's own. This attractive or co-optive power tends to arise from such resources as 
cultural and ideological attraction, as well as the rules of institutions of international 
regimes': Nye, 'The Transformation of World Power', op. cit., p.6.
102 See for example, K. Borisov, 'The Effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Regime', International Affairs (Moscow), 1982, pp.101 -129.
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(i) Theoretical Implications of Constructed 'Hegemony'
Rick Ashley a critical theorist, and Susan Strange, who is not a critical theorist, 
suggest that the analysis of 'hegemons' and 'regimes' can be seen as the logocentric 
creation of a 'sovereign voice'; an external point of reference; a hierarchical representation 
of the political values of strong leadership, discipline over disorder and certainty over 
uncertainty. The term 'regime' connotes regularity, prioritising order over stability, while 
underemphasising the dynamic or disruptive aspects of state and non-state behaviour. 
This perception also suggests that the lack of 'learning' by some states should be 
regarded as problematic, and that the 'stability' of the regime under consensual norms 
may be overstated, despite the high number of regime participants 104
Superpower-centricity, in liberal regime theory, demonstrates Derrida's logocentricity', 
and repeats what Ashley has identified as the 'foundational premise' that the 'structure of 
world political authority may be understood to consist of a number of states and domestic 
societies, each an identifiable sovereign p r e s e n c e 'l l  This is not an 'external reality' 
but a theoretical construct: the creation of an 'heroic practice'; an elevation of the 
perceived role of the sovereign state which marginalises transnational phenomena such as 
social movements and the international political economy of science, technology and 
energy; state formations likely to be associated with particular 'development paradigms', 
and which renders 'ordered' the messy and transient nature of the world order106
Critical or deconstructive analysis can be employed to show how differences and resistent 
practices are defined and concealed, or marginalised, by descriptions which privilege or
103 Strange, 'Cave! hie dragones: a critique of regime analysis', op. cit., pp. 344-346; 
R. Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism' in R.O. Keohane (ed.) Neorealism and its 
Critics. Columbia University Press, New York, 1986.
104 Consideration of the Iraq situation will be referred to briefly, as will the large number 
of other 'third world' states with missile delivery systems capable of carrying nuclear 
warheads (including Egypt, Iran, Syria, Israel, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, Taiwan 
and North Korea).
105 Ashley, 'Living on Border Lines: Man, Postructuralism and War', op.cit., p.260.
106 The latter appeals more to Robert Cox: S. Strange, States and M arkets. Pinter 
Publishers, London, 1988, p. 15.
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make a of moments of unity 107 In Habermasian critical theory, in 'Ideologiekritik', 
the equivalent seems to be the identification of the systematic overlooking of particular 
'truths' or the making of certain kinds of errors in discourses! 08. j n Foucauldian 
analysis the parallel seems to be the construction of boundaries of normalcy and deviance 
in history. Within regime theory this reification may be manifest in the way consensus is 
prioritised over dissensus, when in the nuclear context the dissensus is highly important. 
Through this reification, the perceived 'regime' is represented as a tangible object capable 
of analysis by an 'objective, neutral' observer. What may be better described as a 
dynamic, changing political 'process', or a world 'culturally, socially and institutionally 
determined; .... messy, noisy, and full of disturbances, surprises, and instabilities' 109 
becomes an abstraction - a manifestation of universal tendencies under certain conditions. 
Dissent within the regime will be examined in this paper with this theoretical perception in 
mind.
(ii) Parallels Between Grotian and Critical Interpretations
Using either mainstream or Gramscian 'critical' theory it can be argued that hegemonic 
values determine the shape and operation of a regime. For example, a synonym for the 
extended definition of 'regime' as the convergence of actor expectations within regime 
theory, could be actor 'consensus' in relation to a specific topic or issue, with the 
question of the construction of that consensus being the more problematic aspect. Thus 
an alternative, Gramscian approach to regime might equate consensus with hegemony - 
an approach broadly exemplified in some works by Cox 110, K le in lH , Gill and 
Lawl 12 and Girling 112. This might suggest that regimes develop at a particular point
107 R.Roy, R.B.J. Walker and R.K. Ashley, 'Dialogue: Towards a Critical Social 
Theory of International Politics', Alternatives. vol.XIII, 1988, pp.77 -102 at p.86.
108 R. Guess, The Idea of Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, pp. 43 -44.
109 D. Birch, op.cit., p.2.
110 R. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method', 
Millenium : Journal of International Studies, vol.12, no.2, pp.162 -175.
111 B.S. Klein, 'Hegemony and strategic culture: American power projection and 
alliance defence politics', Review of International Studies, vol.14, 1988, pp.133 -151.
112 S. R. Gill, 'Hegemony, consensus and Trilateralism', Review of International 
Studies, vol.12, 1986, pp.205-221; S.R. Gill and D. Law, The Global Political
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in space and time within a particular configuration of social forces and circumstances, 
with the regime being a particular configuration of power, a collective image of the world 
order and a set of institutions to administer that order. Gramscian 'hegemony' can be 
said to arise through the legitimacy or popular acceptance of the dominant order, or 
through the pervasive construction of reality through particular discursive practices.
Perhaps this convergence of expectations could occur through more liberal 'learning' or 
the pervasiveness of hegemonic, 'soft' co-optive power? Nye has recently recognised the 
parallels between his views and those of Robert Cox. Nye suggests that an increasingly 
important source of national power is 'the universality of a country's culture and its 
ability to establish a set of favorable rules and institutions that govern areas of 
international activity' !!  \  On this basis he argues that the insularity of Japanese culture 
still gives the United States 'the edge' in international power, despite Japan's increasing 
economic strength! !5. Critical international lawyers tend to agree with this view. 
Regarding international law generally, Walker! !6, B lasius^^, Murphy and others, 
have suggested that international law embodies 'Modem Age' hegemonic western values 
- in particular for Murphy, of 'logic, monotheism, science, individualism, nationalism, 
and democracy'^ 18, but that this hegemony has been eroded or 'sundered' by dissent 
from the Marxist states, Islam, and the undeveloped world! 19. Murphy links the
Economy. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1988 and S. Gill, Hegemony and 
the Trilateral Commission. Cambridge University Press, London, 1990.
113 J. Girling, 'Hegemony and Domination in Third World Countries: A Case Study of 
Thailand', Alternatives,vol.X, 1984-5, pp.435 -452.
114 Nye, 'The Changing Nature of World Power', op.cit., p.182.
115 ibid.
116 See various chapters in R.B.J. Walker, Culture. Ideology, and World Order. 
Westview Press, Boulder, 1984.
117 M. Blasius, 'The Discourse of World Order', in ibid, pp.243-257.
118 E.E. Murphy Jr., 'The Vocabulary of International Law in a Post-Modem World', 
Texas International Law Journal, vol.23, 1988, pp.233-249 at p.238.
119 ibid., p.241. Mazrui develops this point a little by referring to the quest for an 
alleged 'Islamic' bomb: A.A. Mazrui, 'The Political Culture of War and Nuclear 
Proliferation: A Third World Perspective', in Dyer and Mangasarian, op.cit., pp.155- 
171.
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hegemony of international law to language and concludes that international law may 
become more a matter of process than substance, providing a forum for communication, 
but that because of increasing dissensus there may be a reversion to greater reliance on 
national rather than international solutions 120 Others using a more Foucauldian 
framework suggest that hegemonic Western 'disciplining and normalising' technologies 
have been incorporated into less developed societies, including its interventionist, 
professional and institutionalising 'discourse of developm ent'll.
Thus, some but not all critical theory, including Gramscian thought, sees social orders, or 
world orders, as maintained by 'hegemonic' belief systems which serve to legitimate the 
interests of dominant states, classes, or class fractions. According to Trubeck, the 
difference between traditional or liberal social science which recognises the importance of 
consciousness and domination, and critical theory, is that the latter advocates the change 
or transformation of that consciousness. For critical theorists social reality is constructed 
through discourses (language and signifying practices), so to challenge that discourse 
renders more possible the changing of that reality. Through deconstructive techniques, 
this becomes the primary project of the critical theorists 122
Given the parallels between Gramscian and Grotian theory, in some respects the 
Gramscian critique of liberal Grotian theory is overstated. Gill and Law for example, 
misleadingly suggest that the 'orthodox realist usage' of the concept of hegemony refers 
to situations of dominance where one state exercises direct power over less powerful 
states, (in a Weberian sense), in contrast to the Gramscian emphasis upon the consent of
120 Murphy, op.cit., p.248. Kennedy's view that international law derives from attempts 
to mediate the contradictions between principles and premises of social life may be 
appropriate in the nuclear issue area because of the tension between the production of 
nuclear energy and the potential to manufacture nuclear weaponry, but details of that view 
are unavailable. It is discussed in J. Boyle, 'Ideals and Things: International Legal 
Scholarship and the Prison-house of language', Harvard International Law Journal. 
vol.26, no.2, 1985, pp. 327-359 at pp.355-356. See also K. Kennedy, 'A New Stream 
of International Law Scholarship', Wisconsin International Law Journal, vol.7, no.l, 
pp.1-49.
121 A. Escobar, 'Discourse and Power in Development: Michel Foucault and the 
Relevance of his Work to the Third World', Alternatives. vol.X, 1984-5, pp.377-400.
122 D.M. Trubeck, 'Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism' 
Stanford Law Review, vol.36, 1984, pp. 575 -622 at pp.590 -592.
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the dominated within the state 1^3 However Grotian realists generally do acknowledge 
that regimes are not characterised by continuous coercion; that structural, ideational and 
cognitive aspects are all important components of the complex methods by which 
hegemonic states acquire and exercise power, and that '[hjabits of obedience on the part 
of subordinate actors can be cultivated over time'1^4 Moreover, even neorealists such 
as Gilpin acknowledge that a community of interests underpins hegemony and that the 
religion or ideology promoted by the hegemonic state justifies its domination of the
o t h e r s ! ^ .
There are also parallels between the Foucauldian and Gramscian concept of networking 
dominant interests and the recognition of 'elite behaviour' in Grotian analysis, again 
undermining critical theory opposition. Puchala and Hopkins for example, who note that 
regimes are primarily 'subjective' attitudinal phenomena which are governed by mutual 
understandings, expectations or conventions about what the norms of the regime are, 
what is legitimate behaviour and what are appropriate decision-making procedures, also 
cite as a central regime feature the:
set of elites who are the practical actors within it. Governments of nation­
states are the prime official members of most international regimes, although 
international, transnational, and sometimes subnational organizations may 
practically and legitimately participate... [RJegime participants are most often 
bureaucratic units or individuals who operate as parts of the "government" of 
an international subsystem by creating, enforcing or otherwise acting in 
compliance with norms. Individuals and bureaucratic roles are linked in 
international networks of activities and communication. These individuals 
and rules govern issue-areas by creating and maintaining regimes 126
123 Gill and Law adopt this somewhat false dichotomy also in their Global Political 
Economy where they categorise current concepts of 'hegemony' in international relations 
theory as that of 'realist' and Gramscian: see pp.76-80, especially at p.77.
124 Young, 'Regime dynamics: the rise and fall of international regimes', op.cit., p.101 
citing H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961, 
pp.49-64. See also D.J. Puchala and R.F. Hopkins, 'International Regimes: lessons 
from inductive analysis' in Krasner, International Regimes, op.cit., pp.61-91 where the 
'normative' aspects of regimes are stressed at pp.62-3.
125 Gilpin, War and Change, p. 30 cited in Tetreault, op cit., p .ll at footnote 47.
126 Puchala and Hopkins, 'International Regimes: lessons from inductive analysis', 
op.cit. p.63.
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Thus just as Gill and Law stress the need for 'mediating concepts such as structural 
power and historic b l o c 'l l ,  some Grotian theorists do already acknowledge the 
complex interplay of structural and ideological power and 'inter-subjective 
understandings', but more so at the elite level. Where the Gramscians may offer greater 
scope is in relation to social forces and broad political dynamics, for the analysis of 
domestic politics in Grotian theory is still highly underdeveloped.
The difficulty which arises in identifying either Grotian or critical 'hegemony' in relation 
to the NNPR is that its 'consensus' has been fraught with tension since its inception, and 
the foundation compromises between the NWS and the NNWS have been challenged at 
most review conferences because of dissatisfaction with the 'unilateralism' of increasing 
nuclear trade restrictions and because of the perceived failure of the NWS to curb nuclear 
arms racing. 'Hegemony' is also a broad brush explanation which glosses the different 
motivations for participation in the NNPR by states at different historical moments. This 
has been especially so for the less 'developed' and non-aligned states. Since these 'Third 
World' states comprise about seventy-five percent of the total membership of the 
NNPR 128 the ciaim to U.S. 'hegemony' within the NNPR sounds a little thin. The 
lack of explicit multilateral endorsement of the recent broadening of the U.S. agenda in 
the Gulf War to destroy potential Iraqi nuclear capabilities independent of NNPR 
processes also illustrates the tenuousness of the NNPR normative consensus as well as 
apparent U.S. unilateralism.
Thus Keeley's argument, purporting to use a Foucauldian framework, may be more 
convincing. He suggests that regimes are loci of tension: that the actors supporting the 
dominant discourse seek to extend its grasp to others, while those holding 'subjugated 
knowledges' pursue resistant practices 129 These resistant practices have been 
marginalised in most of the texts of Nye and Smith. Taken to its logical conclusion, this 
view would redefine the concept of regime and challenge the notion of co-operative 
behaviour as dominant within the regime, despite the high number of regime participants.
127 'Historic bloc' refers to 'a historical congruence or unity between material forces, 
institutions, and ideologies;the organic link between modes of production and specific 
historial ideas, Gill and Law, op. cit., p.64.
128 J. Dhanapala, 'Disappointment in the Third World', The Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, vol.46, no.6, 1990, pp.30 -31.
129 Keeley, op.cit., pp.98-99.
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It may also be important to identify the 'hegemonic' effect of the discursive practices of 
the international elite, not just on state behaviour, (as Nye still seems to despite his 
recognition of the limits of 'realism' and his advocacy of a transnational focus), but also 
for social movements and 'domestic' politics, and to trace back that effect on official state 
policy and regimes. Nye advocates this when he argues the case for 'learning' under 
regimes, but he has not yet incorporated that broader focus 'empirically' in his study of 
the NNPR. An examination of the extent to which the western, specifically anti-nuclear 
peace movement has drawn on NNPR norms to justify its campaigns thus seems 
essential. The anti-nuclear peace movement is less important for 'Third World' states 
however. This point will be picked up in my conclusions about the prospects for the 
regime.
(a) Logocentricity in Regime Formation
Logocentricity is evident in many of Nye's texts which identify the beginning of the 
NNPR with U.S. President Eisenhower's 1953 Atoms for Peace Program, which he 
suggests was the second attempt at regime formation, after the failed Baruch Plan 130 
Smith's view is preferable, that states agreed that the possession of nuclear weapons 
was undesirable, but their non-aligned status should be stressed also , which Smith does 
not do.
The following quotes from several of Nye's texts indicate his prioritising of the 
superpower roles in the NNPR's formation:
The nonproliferation case is a good example of the development of an 
international security regime as a subissue of the overall 
U.S.-Soviet relationship!31.
It has been said that the ultimate success of a national policy occurs when a country is 
able to elevate its interest to the level of a general principle. In that sense, American 
nonproliferation policy over the year has been surprisingly successful. The United States
130 jsjye? 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p. 17; Nye, 'U.S.-Soviet 
Cooperation in a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.336. This is also evident in Tate's 
article, op.cit.
131 ibid., p.337.
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has helped to foster an international regime that establishes a general presumption against 
proliferation .... 132
[The Atoms for Peace Program] did serve to create an initial consensus on 
which to build. Essentially, the most powerful state in the nuclear issue area 
used its power to attract others to a normative frameworkl33.
Elsewhere, he states that:
.... despite the faults in implementation, our approach between 1954 and
1974 had two major accomplishments: the isolation of the commercial fuel 
cycle from nuclear weapons uses and the establishment of a a general climate 
of opinion against the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities!34
It was only after the change from confrontation to limited detente, in 1963, 
that the basis was set for cooperation on nonproliferation. Even then, the 
multilateral talks in the ENDC from 1964 to 1966 made little progress until 
detente eroded the bipolar diplomatic constraints that had previously inhibited
cooperation 135
Other analysts tend to support this 'hegemonic' approach! 36. Several of these writers 
have been identified by Smith when he correctly criticises this 'initial hegemon' view 137
132 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.16.
133 ibid., p.17.
134 Nye, 'Planning a Safeguardable Nuclear Future', op.cit., p.185.
135 Nye, 'U.S.-Soviet Co-operation in a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.343.
136 L. Scheinman, The International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Nuclear 
Order. Resources for the Future, Washington D.C., 1987, for example, pp.273-274.
137 P. Lellouche, 'International Nuclear Politics', Foreign Affairs, vol.58, 1979-80, 
pp.336-350 at p.347; D.A.V. Fischer, 'Nuclear Issues: International Control and 
International Co-operation', Canberra Studies in World Affairs No. 5. Department of 
International Relations, Australian National University, 1981, p. 20 and see p. 15; P.A. 
Clausen, 'US Nuclear Exports and the Non-Proliferation Regime', in J.C. Snyder and 
S.F. Wells, Limiting Nuclear Proliferation. Ballinger, Cambridge, 1985, p.190, cited in 
Smith, op.cit., p.264.
35.
which suggests that power accrues to 'hegemonic' states because of their ability to supply 
the collective goods 138 that enable regimes to be created and to function effectively 
while enhancing those states' perceived national in terest^^. Fischer, for example, 
seems to suggest that the regime was 'imposed' as the 'hegemonic' state exploited 
structurally-induced 140 subservient behaviour or incorporated sanctions and incentives 
to constrain 'weaker' member-state behaviour while for Nye this outcome was the result 
of 'learning'. Variations on Fischer and Nye's model might include a greater emphasis 
on state demand for international regimes, made as a 'rational choice' in response to 
opportunities and constraints within the fluid international system ^l.
Instead of focussing on the role of the superpowers in the formation and maintenance of 
the NNPR, a far less majestic and 'reassuring' representation of history could reverse the 
state hierarchies in the text and deny the image of superpowers in control. They are 
reduced to a necessary but insufficient 'presence'. For example, still within a Grotian 
'realist' state-centric framework, one could focus instead on the 'small-movers' rather 
than the 'big-shakers' and present an inverted representation of the main instigators of the 
NPT negotiations and extend recognition to other 'active participants' or agents in the 
construction of history. Shaker, for example, although not a critical theorist, argues that 
the NPT was conceived in a resolution presented to the U.N. General Assembly 
(U.N.G.A.) by Ireland, which was passed unanimously in 1961, and was developed by 
a later resolution (Resolution 2028[XX]) presented by an eight-member non-aligned 
grouping, which developed statements made by a United Arab Republic
138 R.O. Keohane, 'The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International 
Economic Regimes, 1967-77', in Ole R. Holsti, R. Silverson and A. George (eds.), 
Changes in the International System. Westview, Boulder, 1980 cited in Krasner, 
International Regimes, op. cit., p. 15.
139 See for example, Keohane, ibid., and Cahn, op.cit. and the references cited in fn. 
89.
140 Young, 'Regime dynamics: the rise and fall of international regimes' in Krasner, 
op.cit., p.101.
141 Here co-operation to form regimes is seen as a means of states collectively attaining 
mutually beneficial results which may not be attainable otherwise. These results are 
usually organised by a state 'entrepreneur' which expects to gain more itself from the 
regime than it invests in organising the activity: Keohane, 'The demand for international 
regimes' op.cit., pp. 144-5, 150, 155. See also R.O. Keohane, After Hegemony: 
Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1984.
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representative 142. These two resolutions embodied the basic principles on which the 
NPT was negotiated.
Nye does acknowledge that the regime was built upon an Irish proposal, but he privileges 
the superpower role!43 He states:'This treaty originated in a 1958 Irish proposal in the 
United Nations that was repeated through the early 1960s'144 an(j that 'Building on an 
Irish proposal at the United Nations in 1961, the United States and the U.S.S.R. pursued 
their interests in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons by using a mix of bilateral and 
UN procedures....'145. There is no mention here of a motivating factor for the treaty: 
superpower arms 'racing'. '[R]epeated through the early 1960s' suggests the initiative 
was humdrum, commonplace. The NPT also only proceeded he suggests, when the 
superpowers pursued their interests - not the interests of any other. Shaker suggests 
instead that Ireland was a small country with 'no special reasons' for taking such an 
active role, beyond having a concerned Minister for External Affairs, a general 
dissatisfaction with the slow progress of general disarmament talks, and a fear of the 
dangers of leaving the proliferation problem subsumed within that broader stagnating 
debate 146. Moreover, preliminary negotiations on the NPT had already begun when, in 
1964, at the instigation of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, President Johnson 
appointed a high-level committee to examine the proliferation issue to 'recommend 
whether or not non-proliferation should be made a top priority of U.S. foreign 
policy. '147
The argument put by critical theorists that 'regimes' are difficult to identify and define 
also appears to be sustained in relation to the NNPR because its beginning is elusive. 
One may refer furtively to myriad United Nations declarations, resolutions and 
conventions or to state practice as indicative of the development of international norms
142 M.I. Shaker, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation 
1959-1979. Volume 1, Oceana Publications, London, 1980, pp.5, 42.
143 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.18.
144 Nye, 'U.S.-Soviet Co-operation in a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.336.
145 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit, p.18.
146 ibid., p.5.
147 D. Yergin, 'The Terrifying Prospect: Atomic Bombs Everywhere', in P. Joseph and 
S. Rosenblum (eds.), Search For Sanitv: The Politics of Nuclear Weapons and 
Disarmament. Southend Press, Boston, 1984, pp. 193-208 at p.203
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regarding war and disarmament 148 but there is no clear 'beginning' for the NNPR. 
Non-proliferation resolutions had been passed in the UN as early as 1946, and the Soviet 
Union and the U.S. advanced proposals in the disarmament Commission in 1956 and 
1957 respectively. In 1958 and 1959 Ireland submitted draft resolutions on non­
proliferation, including the proposal that an international agreement prohibit the transfer 
of NW by NWS to non-NWS and that non-NWS agree not to manufacture any nuclear 
devices, but the Soviet Union opposed that on the basis that it did not deal with stationed 
NW - a concern about collective defence arrangements which was to dog discussions 
until 1966. A 1961 Swedish proposal to have the U.N. determine the conditions under 
which non-NWS would agree to non-proliferation was passed, and reciprocity between 
non-NWS and NWS in disarmament commitments was insisted upon. Draft treaties were 
moved by the U.S. and the S.U. in 1962, and in 1965 the non-proliferation issue 
dominated Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (hereafter ENDC) discussions. In 
1965 the non-aligned bloc stated their commitment to non-proliferation irrespective of any 
treaty and the U.S. and S.U. each submitted differing draft treaties. Between 1966 and 
1968 bilateral U.S. and Soviet talks on non-proliferation sufficiently resolved differences 
over collective defence, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereafter NATO) and the 
involvement of the Federal Republic of Germany in U.S. nuclear strategy (following the 
abandonment by the U.S. of the proposed Multi-Lateral Force under NATO control) to 
enable the conclusion of new identical drafts which was presented to the ENDC in 1968, 
and as revised after discussion, to the U.N. General Assembly First Committee later that 
year. Those drafts were regarded as heavily weighted in favour of the superpowers and 
amendments were insisted upon by 'smaller' states to redress that imbalance 149
148 p or various examinations of the international law of nuclear weaponry and 
disarmament see for example: G. Schwarzenberger, The Legality of Nuclear Weapons. 
Stevens and Son, London, 1958; Australian Lawyers for Nuclear Disarmament NSW 
Research Group, 'Are nuclear weapons legal?', Legal Service Bulletin. August, 1986, 
pp. 158-161; extracts collected in: H.J. Evans, Case for the World Court, being an open 
letter to the Members of the United Nations, Typed Manuscript, May 1987; Hague 
Declaration of the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, adopted 
by the IALANA General Assembly on September 24,1989, reproduced in Alternatives. 
vol.XV, 1990, pp. 129 -131.
149 See D.W. Greig, 'The interpretation of treaties and Article IV.2 of the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty', Australian Yearbook of International Law, vol.6, 1978, pp.77 -118 
at p.79 on this point. The term 'small' uses the binary oppositions in Nye's and Smith's 
texts but as is argued here such 'small' states can be represented as 'powerful' in 
normative 'mobilisation'.
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Highly significant changes were suggested for the NPT by non-hegemonic states. In the 
First Committee changes were made to recognise the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear 
explosions. A NWS undertaking to pursue disarmament negotiations in good faith was 
also secured, and the rights of states to develop regional nuclear free zones was 
recognised. Nuclear free zones have since become dynamic nonproliferation instruments. 
Such changes were made at the instigation of non-superpower states, with small countries 
such as Mexico, Romania, Sweden and other non-aligned states playing an active role in 
the ENDC negotiations, while others renounced nuclear weapons independent of U.S. 
initiatives 1^0 Mexico, Switzerland, Japan, West Germany, and Italy were particularly 
active in relation to the proposed article on nuclear trade, now Article IV ^  1. In debate 
the U.S. and S.U. emphasised the prohibitions on proliferation and the strengths of the 
safeguards regime. Emphasis was given by the NNWS to the duties of NWS to address 
comprehensive disarmament issues, and security assurances were given to non-NWS in 
the form of a re-affirmed, but nevertheless fairly weak, commitment by the Security 
Council on collective security This increasing role played by smaller powers in the
150 por example Sweden and Canada had renounced the NW option long before the NPT 
was drafted: A. Vanaik, 'Why NPT is Unacceptable', Economic and Political W eekly. 
vol.XXIII, 1988, pp. 1825-6 at p.1826; and the Federal Republic of Germany has stated 
that it had 'as early as October 1954, in the Brussels Treaty, renounced the manufacture 
of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and accepted relevant controls': 'Statement 
by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany on Signing the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', reproduced in United Nations, Department for 
Disarmament Affairs, Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament 
A greem ents. Third Edition, United Nations, New York, 1988, p.87. India also 
renounced the nuclear weapon option early, but more recent developments have eroded 
the credibility of that declaration: J.R. Walczak, 'Legal Implications of Indian Nuclear 
Development', Journal of International Law and Policy, vol. 4, 1974, pp.237-256 at 
237. In terms of regime formation, these renunciations are important, even if later 
abandoned, as they detract from superpower-centricity in regime theory.
151 Shaker, op.cit., vol.II, pp. 556-7; Greig, op.cit., p.79; J.Johnson-Freese, 
'Interpretations of the Nonproliferation Treaty: The U.S. and West Germany', Journal of 
International Affairs, vol.37, no.2, 1984, pp.283 -293 at p.286.
152 Resolution 255 of 1968 which recognised that aggression with NW, or the threat 
thereof, against a NNWS part to the NPT would call for immediate Security Council 
action: United Nations and Disarm am ent, op. cit., p.83. However, this 'positive 
assurance' is said to add nothing to pre-existing obligations under the U.N. Charter and 
of the Security Council, which were and are also weak because they are subject to a veto 
by a member of the Security Council. Since the five acknowledged NWS are the five
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U.N. in relation to the peaceful resolution of conflict and especially in the field of arms 
control and disarmament, belies the recent academic focus on alleged hegemonic state 
behaviour. Thus the role of non-superpower states, especially the non-aligned, and 
institutional bargaining within the U.N. and its specialised committees and agencies were 
important in the development of the NNPR, but the role of these actors tends to be lost 
within the simplistic glossing of state-centric hegemonic regime theory.
(b) Logocentricity in Regime Maintenance
The argument raised by critical theorists that the definitions of regimes are 'flabby' 153, 
partly because the signifiers 'principles', 'norms' and 'rules' have indeterminate 
meanings and content, can be sustained in relation to the NNPR. 'Deconstructively', the 
term betrays itself by its elusive or flabby actuality - an actuality it shares with all 
language. Article IV, which purports to give non-nuclear weapon states NNWS access to 
nuclear energy for 'peaceful' purposes, can be cited as a clear example of an unclear 
obligation at international law 1^4 ß ut ^ may ^  unnecessary to resort to deconstruction 
to conclude that the concept of regimes is elusive, for mainstream international lawyers 
already recognise that international treaty provisions may create an illusion of consensus 
about particular norms when potential areas of conflict have simply been glossed over to 
facilitate the conclusion of the treaty 155 But an unclear obligation at international law 
does not necessarily mean the same thing as principles, norms and rules being 
indeterminate and this may demonstrate the differences between international relations 
theory about regimes and international law and regimes. Regime theory tends to 
downplay conflict within regimes, suggesting that states' calculations of interest, or 
learning under regimes, encourage consensual behaviour.
permanent members of the Security Council, and one may be responsible for the 
threatened aggression, that NWS could frustrate any action thought desirable by the 
Security Council : Greig, op.cit., p.107; J. B. Schwartz, 'Controlling Nuclear 
Proliferation: Legal Strategies of the United States', Law and Policy in International 
Business, vol.20, 1988, pp.l -61 at p.9.
153 F. Kratochwil, 'Regimes, Interpretation and the 'Science' of Politics: A 
Reappraisal', Millenium: Journal of International Studies, vol.17, no.2, 1988, pp.263 - 
284. Although not a critical theorist, Susan Strange has made the same point: S. Strange, 
'Cave! hie dragones: a critique of regime analysis', op.cit., pp.337, 343.
154 This is explored well in Greig, op.cit.
155 See for example, Greig,op.cit., p.82.
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Critical theorists have also argued that rather than examining norms and rules as referent 
'objective' realities, analysts need to look to the intersubjective interpretations made by 
the actors within the 'regime' as to what 'social practices' govern their behaviour, as 
'independent' authoritative interpretations are r a r e ly ,  a  postructuralist reading of 
international law would also suggest that state interpretations are an effect of power or 
privilege, and that the textual 'reading' of the law is reconstituted as the discourse of an 
appointed authority. This would seem to be accommodated within liberal theory and the 
ordinary precepts of international law, where state practices and state declarations of 
understanding in part 'create' the meaning of international law. International lawyers 
recognise that treaty wording is often imprecise, that negotiating parties may have 
divergent opinions, that particular developments may not have been adverted to during 
negotiations, and that meanings may be changed by subsequent state practices 1^7
Critical 'reading' or deconstruction may be more useful in identifying the assumptions in 
texts which purport to universalise norms which are more narrowly supported in the 
international arena. Nye and Smith, for example, in some texts assume that 'nuclear 
stability' under deterrence is an implicit or closely associated norm of the NNPR. This is 
not a sustainable position, as will be demonstrated.
(b . l )  Doctrines of Nuclear Deterrence
Nye and Smith see as an adjunct to or as an implicit element of the NNPR the notion that 
the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and 'extended deterrence' under a nuclear 'umbrella' 
underpins international stability and security. Both Nye and Smith thus adopt a 
problematic conception of 'security' which unquestioningly incorporates representations 
of expert management of nuclear weaponry by experienced national security planners in 
superpower states - a representation suggesting effective, stable 'strategic rationality'. In 
the mid-seventies , Nye appeared to be more concerned with energy security 1^8 but 
latterly he suggests that the 'world has seen a surprising nuclear stability' 1^9
156 Kratochwil, 'Regimes, Interpretation and the 'Science' of Politics : A Reappraisal', 
op.cit., p.279.
157 Greig, op.cit., pp.92 -93.
158 Nye, 'Balancing Nonproliferation and Energy Security', op.cit.
159 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime’, op.cit., p.36.
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But is the nuclear order 'stable'? Some commentators suggest that it has been more akin 
to 'messy state in teractions'll, extremely fragile psychological relationships! 61 or 
symbolic representations (signs) of the current political economy of power! 62 The 
alleged 'prudence' in the superpower relationship may also be questioned given the 
number of times the use of nuclear weaponry in regional conflicts has been threatened by
a superpower 163.
Nye and Smiths' view differs significantly from other textual representations of the NPT 
negotiations when both the U.S. and the Soviet Union declined to enter into any new 
'positive' security guarantees that nuclear weapons would be available to deter the 
threatened use of such weapons by an adversary, and since effective and legally binding 
'negative' security guarantees have been constantly sought by, but not granted to, the 
NNWs164. Regarding positive assurances, the U.S. has merely reaffirmed its existing 
obligations, such as under the North Atlantic Treaty, which do not require a nuclear 
assistance commitment!65, although this is implied by stationing nuclear weapons in
160 t .w . Luke, ' "What's Wrong with Deterrence?" A Semiotic Interpretation of 
National Security Policy', in J. Der Derian and M.J. Shapiro, op.cit., pp.207-229 at
p.211.
161 ibid., p.215, quoting F. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence. University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1987.
162 Luke, op.cit., p.219. See also E. Thompson, 'Deterrence and Addiction', in 
Bamaby and Thomas op.cit.; H. Bull, 'The Prospects for Deterrence' in B. H. Weston 
(ed.), Toward Nuclear Disarmament and Global Security: A Search for Alternatives. 
Westview Press, Boulder, 1984, pp. 252-263 and M. MccGwire, 'Deterrence: the 
problem - not the solution', International Affairs, vol.62, no.l, 1985-1986, pp.55-70.
163 Nuclear threats: Northern Iran (1946); Berlin (1948); Korea (1950,1953); Peoples 
Republic of China (1958); Cuba (1962); Middle East (1973); Vietnam (1954, 1968, 
1972) and the 'carte blance' implied by the Carter Doctrine on behalf of rapid deployment 
force in Persian Gulf: Klein, 'Hegemony and Strategic Culture', op.cit., p.140; J. Petras 
and M. Morley, 'Nuclear War and the US-third World Relations: The Neglected 
Dimension', Economic and Political Weekly. January 23, 1988, pp.151-158.
164 At the Tenth Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly a record was made of 
the unilateral declarations made by NWS to NNWS regarding the use or threat of use of 
NW but this is not the international legally binding instrument sought by the NNWS.
165 Shaker, Volume II, op.cit., p.518.
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Europe. The Soviet Union also avoided extending its alliance commitments during NPT 
negotiations. Moreover, the lack of the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella is said to 
be France's prime motivation for acquiring its own nuclear arsenal 166 This lack of 
positive guarantees under the NNPR also raises doubts about the strength of the claims 
that a decline in power of the hegemonic states, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, or a 
folding of their 'nuclear umbrellas' , might jeopardise the renewal of the NPT in 1995 
since more countries might seek independent deterrents!*^. The iinks between the 
NNPR and such extended deterrence, and the credibility of such deterrence would need to 
be more explicit for this view to be tenable. North Korea and Iraq are amongst the few 
states which formally endorse the NNPR while flouting its norms by still seeking 
independent nuclear capability. Their motivation for that does not derive from contracting 
extended deterrence however because in the 1980s Iraq enjoyed the benefaction of both 
'Eastern' and 'Western' states. More recently both the U.S. and the Soviet Union are 
asserting interests in preventing proliferation in the Middle East. Recently Nye is also 
acknowledging that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have come to see nuclear 
weapons as unusable!68, which undercuts his earlier insistence on the logic of nuclear 
deterrence.
As to 'negative' assurances, for more than 10 years the Conference on Disarmament has 
been holding consultations and negotiations seeking to conclude effective international 
assurances !^ ^  but to date it has been unsuccessful in reaching agreement. The NWS 
have however made various unilateral declarations to assure NNWS that nuclear weapons 
will not be used against NNWS, most recently at the Fourth Review C onference!^ .
166 ibid., p.519.
167 J. Simpson, 'Nonproliferation Agenda: Beyond 1990', The Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, vol.46, no.6, 1990, pp.38-39; A. Mack, 'Comments: Session 2', Typescript 
comments. Conference on Non-Proliferation in a Disarming World: Prospects for the 
90s, Groupe de Bellerive Vlth International Colloquium, Geneva, June 20-21, 1990.
168 Nye, 'Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security regimes', op.cit., pp.385-7.
169 Australia. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Agreed Review Conference 
Language', in 'Special Disarmament Issue', Backgrounder, vol.30, no.l, 1990, pp.7 -14 
at p.14.
170 C.N. Van Doren and G. Bunn, 'Progress and Peril and The Fourth NPT Review 
Conference', Arms Control Today. 1990, pp.8-10 at p.8.
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Apart from the limited nature of the negative 'collective security' guarantee finally 
acquired during NPT negotiations, which is subject to a U.N. Security Council veto in 
any event, there are more fundamental problems in Nye's view. In most articles he 
seems to assume that the U.S. view of nuclear strategy is shared by the rest of the world 
(that is, effective extended deterrence prevents the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the 
allies of an assumed bi-polar world!71) and he downplays the differences between the 
U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategies!72, when in fact the doctrine of deterrence has been 
developed by military strategists and is primarily advocated by the U.S. and NATO 
members. But increasing disenchantment with the doctrine is said to pervade U.S. and 
NATO military establishments!73 The Soviet Union has been more sceptical about 
deterrence, preferring to treat nuclear weapons more as conventional weaponry with the 
capacity to deny victory rather than to deter by punishment!74, Both Smith and Nye 
suggest that the doctrine within the NNPR is a 'paradox' when in fact deterrence had 
been central to U.S. strategic planning for decades prior to the formulation of the NNPR. 
The U.S. had also 'enjoyed ' a deterrent posture in relation to the U.S.S.R. for at least 
fifteen years after it had acquired nuclear capabilities as the Soviet Union then lacked the 
capacity to strike U.S. territory.
Nye and Smith take as a positivist fact that a 'simple' deterrence has kept the peace, 
though it is an unprovable interpretation, and it overlooks the destabilising developments 
of different deterrent strategies. Both the U.S.!75 and the S.U. have taken different 
views as to which armaments are to be included in calculations of the 'military balance',
171 The question of Chinese, French and British extended deterrence is not addressed.
172 In Nye, 'Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security regimes', op.cit., Nye suggests 
that the U.S. and the Soviet Union may not hold common nuclear norms but they have 
nevertheless 'learnt' regarding deterrent force structures.
173 For evidence and reasoning see T. Findlay, 'Arms Control in the 1990s', Working 
paper No. 70. Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1989, 
pp.5-7. Unilateral statements were made at the Tenth Session of the General Assembly : 
ibid.
174 J. Erikson, 'The Soviet View of Deterrence' in F. Barnaby and G. Thomas (eds), 
The Nuclear Arms Race -Control or Catastrophe. Frances Pinter, London, 1982, pp.73- 
93.
175 while even within the U.S. administration views differ as to what constitutes nuclear 
parity: R. N. Lebow, 'Misconceptions in American Strategic Assessment', Political 
Science Quarterly, vol.97, no.2, 1982, pp. 187-206.
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rendering talk of 'stability' highly p rob lem atic^^ , while the impact of the increasing 
acceptability of the notion of limited nuclear war, as a destabilising, 'horizontal' 
proliferative f a c t o r j s not accounted for. Also neither power has really subscribed to 
the deterrence doctrine's early injunctions about mutual vulnerability, with both sides 
involved in strengthening offensive and defensive capabilities, thereby rendering the 
strategic order inherently u n s tab le !^  ancj has increased the risks of war by accident, 
miscalculation or misperception 179 Nye does concede this latter point however 1^0 
Strategic modernisation continues to jeopardise 'crisis stability' in bilateral U.S.-Soviet 
relations, with the arms control and disarmament process seriously lagging behind recent 
improvements in East-West relations. In the next decade for example, dangerously 
destabilising deployments are forecast to include U.S. Trident II submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles and nuclear-armed Tomahawk and land-attack sea-launched cruise 
missiles. U.S. anti-submarine warfare capabilities are also being enhanced^ 1.
176 Erikson, op.cit., p.85; I. Claude, Power and International Relations. Random 
House, London, 1962, especially chapters 2 and 3; R. Little, Historians and the Balance 
of Power: Unveiling the Dark Obscurities, Seminar Paper, Department of International 
Relations, Australian National University, September, 1988. Nye does acknowledge 
some of these problems: Nye, 'Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security regimes', 
op.cit., p.382, but not in the context of his claims about stability within the NNPR which 
is my primary concern.
177 Rotblat, op.cit., p. 121.
178 F. C. Ikle, 'Nuclear Strategy - Can There Be a Happy Ending?', Foreign Affairs. 
vol.63, 1985, pp.810-826 at pp. 816, 818, and D. Ball, 'The Future of the Strategic 
Balance', in L.S. Hagen (ed), The Crisis in Western Security. Groom Helm, London, 
1982, pp.121-143.
179 'Stable peace' is well deconstructed in H. Tromp, 'Unstable Peace: Nuclear 
Deterrence', Review of International Affairs, vol.38, 1987, pp.22-27. See also R. J. 
Lifton and R.A. Falk, Indefensible Weapons: The political and psychological case against 
nuclearism. Basic Books, New York, 1982, p.212 and S.H. Kober, 'Strategic Defense, 
Deterrence and Arms Control', Washington Quarterly, vol.10, no .l, 1987, pp. 123-135 
at p.124.
180 Nye? 'NPT: The Logic of Inequality', op.cit.
181 Mack, 'Comments', op.cit., p.2.
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The non-aligned movement has been highly critical of the assumed links between nuclear 
deterrence and the NNPR. It was instrumental during NPT negotiations in having Article 
VI, which creates an obligation to negotiate arms control and disarmament inserted as a 
substantive article in the NPT rather than as merely a preambular statement as initially 
proposed in the superpower d rafts^^ . That Article requires NPT parties 'to pursue 
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms 
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control'. Non-aligned opposition is 
partly based on the fact that extended deterrence is not applicable to the non-aligned. 
India, for example, has regarded the security guarantees undertaken in conjunction with 
the NPT as highly unsatisfactory, as has P ak is tan i^  although Pakistan is more clearly 
aligned with the U.S.
(b.2) Nuclear Learning
Learning under hegemony is an implicit and explicit component of both critical and 
Grotian theoretical frameworks respectively. They differ however on their initial unit of 
analysis. Grotians are far more state-centric, despite acknowledging the role of 'elites'; 
whereas Gramscians focus on dominant interests, class, and the formation of popular 
ideologies within states, then extrapolate out from that 'complex of civil society'1^4 into 
the international system. Smith for example, argues that when the regime was formed 
states had had little interaction on the nuclear issue, but their views were nevertheless 
convergent. This is state-centric as it discounts the peace movement, transnational the 
interests of the transnational nuclear industry, transnational media and other 
'interdependent' interests. Under the Gramscian view, states participating in hegemonic 
regimes have accepted the essential 'rightness' of the dominant order, as have the 
dominant classes within those states. 185
Critical theorists tend to condemn regime theory for being ahistorical and apolitical. 
Robert Cox, for example, suggests that regime theory 'tries to find general propositions 
about political behaviour abstracted from historical process. 186* Rick Ashley also
182 Shaker, op.cit., pp.566-7.
183 Waczak, op.cit., p.254.
184 Tetreault, op.cit., p.9.
185 ibid.
186 Cox, op.cit., p.442.
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suggests that the study of non-state actors would be one way of offering a more 
theoretically informed assessment of state behaviour regarding regimes 187 jn one 0f his 
studies of the 'international order'. But there Ashley addresses the 'problematique' of the 
theoretical construction of state boundaries, tending to confine his focus to the 
representation and construction of the 'heroic practice' of state sovereignty, which he then 
renders problematic by the identification and analysis of domestic non-state actor activity. 
Ashley thus seems to have confined his critical readings of international collaboration and 
co-operation within the traditional boundaries of realist state-centric behaviour and 
transnationalist links. He identifies the 'problem of order in the absence of an orderer', 
and then narrows his interpretation to vertical and lateral images of state sovereignty and 
transnationalism respectively. He focuses on the 'construction and representation of the 
state' while also purporting to explore international anarchy and order. But state- 
centricity is a major criticism of mainstream realism. He defines the theoretical 
'problematique' of 'anarchy' narrowly - suggesting that the 'fact of anarchy' is seen as a 
'foundational truth' in international affairs, and the literature he cites in support of this 
statement can be classified fairly as 'realist'^88.
What critical theorists seem to have not yet done, in relation to regime theory, is to 
analyse the feedback effect of regimes on domestic politics and social movements, when 
this would seem to be invited by critical theory's 'emancipatory' norm. Critical theory 
suggests that by encouraging 'meta-theorising' and reflectivity about mainstream 
perceptions of 'reality' that human emancipation can be encouraged^^. The symbolic 
and rhetorical value of the NNPR and other international disarmament and arms control 
activities for the modern peace movements, and the flow on effects in domestic and 
international politics, for example, justifies serious examination although the specific 
causal mechanisms are problematic. On the other hand, the emergence of the peace 
movement may also accord with Foucauldian notions of the creation of 'political subjects'
187 Ashley, 'Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy 
Problematique', op.cit.
188 ibid., p.256. Another work by Ashley is far superior, and accommodates some of 
these criticisms. There he critically deconstructs hegemony in interational relations 
discourse. See R.K. Ashley, 'Imposing International Purpose: Notes on a Problematic of 
Governance' in Czempial, E. and Rosenau, J.N. Global Changes and Theoretical 
Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s. Lexington Books, 
Massachusetts, 1989, pp.252-193.
189 Ashley, 'Living on Border - Lines: Man, Postructuralism and War', op.cit., at 
p.284.
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under the discourses and procedures of 'expert cultures'190  ^in that the peace movement 
tends to espouse the rhetorical values endorsed at the U.N. by state representatives 
professionally participating in 'security ' rituals and practices. Some Grotian varients of 
regime theory do attempt to incorporate political dynamics, and scholars such as Robert 
Putnam, Peter Haas and Ernst Haas are attempting to deal with the difficult question of 
how to incorporate domestic and international arenas, although these are not yet central in 
regime discourse. This problem of political boundaries has been conceded by Nye 
however 191. Nevertheless, the underplaying of domestic politics in current analyses of 
'learning' suggests that progress in this respect is not going to be rapid within the Grotian 
school, and the theory also may not accommodate well the non-existence of alleged 
'learning' by some states.
The Grotian framework explains neither why so many states were keen to tap into the 
nuclear energy option, nor how optimism for the industry was socially constructed; nor 
what development paradigms it embodied; nor how particular interests in the supplier 
states may have been served by the NNPR. Nye and Smith seem to prioritise the security 
elements of the regime. An appraisal of the creeping hegemony of 'modernism' and of 
science and technology, in the tradition of Feyerabend, Habermas or Foucault here may 
have been most appropriate. This enthusiasm for nuclear technology might also be 
explained as an historical phenomenon, synonymous with the spread of bureaucracy, 
perhaps as an 'elite adaptation to the encroachment of capitalism' in newly industrialising
econom ies!92
The traditionally close relationship between governments and the nuclear industry, and 
the political economy of that relationship, also warrants close analysis. In the U.S. for 
example, generous government financial assistance^93 was provided to the U.S.
190 t .w . Luke, 'Foucault and the Discourses of Power: Developing a Genealogy of the 
Political Culture Concept', in T.W. Luke, Social Theory and Modernity: Critique. 
Dissent and Revolution. Sage publications, Newbury Park, 1990, pp.241-268 at p.242.
191 See the discussion of process and structure in Keohane and Nye, Power and 
Interdependence, op.cit, pp.33-35; Keohane and Nye, 'Power and Interdependence 
Revisited', p.739.
192 Girling,op.cit., p.439.
193 The financial assistance was made available under the Foreign Assistance Act 
(particular purpose grants); Atomic Energy Act (eligibility for exports of nuclear 
materials, components and reactors) and under the Export-Import Bank Act (guarantees, 
insurance or credit): Schwartz, op.cit., p.52.
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nuclear industry, probably at the expense of potential alternative energy suppliers, and to 
overseas purchasers. By the mid—fifties, the U.S. government (with the U.S. Atomic 
Energy Commission playing a central role) had secured twenty-nine Agreements of Co­
operation with 'friendly' states to supply small research reactors, and later credit 
assistance was provided by the U.S. Export-Import Bank to encourage power reactor 
construction in co-operation with the two U.S. manufacturing giants Westinghouse and 
General Electric 194 The U.S. Export-Import Bank provided overall about $U.S. 7.1 
billion for the export of 49 U.S. reactors worldwide; including to South Korea, Taiwan 
and the Philippines 195 Westinghouse and General Electric had command of ninety per 
cent of the European nuclear energy market by the late sixties, and the implications of 
this for proliferation risks is significant. Yergin argues that the U.S. commercial light 
water reactor design derived from that of the U.S. Navy's submarine reactor - and that 
the designers, mainly ex-military employees, did not specifically address proliferation 
concernsl96.
The Grotian tradition evident in both Smith and Nye's work is impaired unnecessarily by 
a 'realist' focus on state action, despite fleeting references to public opinion. A less state­
centric approach which did not marginalise the fluctuating role of non-government 
organisations, the peace movement and business interests in particular, would look far 
more closely at these social forces' contribution to state non-proliferation discourse 197 
although as noted above, this is possible within both Nye and Smith's framework. This
194 Pringle and Spigelman, op. cit., p.168.
195 J. Surrey, Energy Policy, October 1988, quoted in R. Bolt, Banning the Mining and 
Export of Uranium, Submission to the Australian Labor Party Uranium Policy Review 
Committee, May, 1989, p.10.
196 Yergin,op.cit., pp.201-2.
197 For example by tracing the occasional successes of the scientific lobby in the early 
post-war years urging control over atomic energy: see A.S. Krass, P. Boskma, B. Elzen 
and W.A. Smith, Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation. Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, Taylor and Francis, London, 1983, p.193 and L. 
Ackland and S. McGuire (eds.), Assessing the Nuclear Age. Educational Foundation for 
Nuclear Science, Chicago, 1986, pp.xi-xiii. See for example, H. Brown, 'Introduction' 
in Ackland and McGuire, ibid, pp.xi-xvii, on the role of U.S. nuclear scientists. R. 
Boardman and J.F. Keeley discuss domestic political influences in: 'Regime-making and 
the Limits of Consensus' in R. Boardman and J.F. Keeley, Nuclear Exports and World 
Politics: Policy and Regime. The Macmillan Press Limited in association with the Centre 
for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, London, 1983, pp.234-246.
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approach would also be more likely to seriously examine the role of transnational 
organisations such as Euratom and the European Organization for Nuclear Research 
(CERN). It has been argued, for example, that the London Suppliers Group supply 
guidelines and their Trigger List were drawn up at the instigation of the industrial 
corporations concerned, and that they benefitted commercially therefrom 198
The characteristics of the social formations in the recipient states which have undertaken 
to import the expensive, sophisticated nuclear research and energy technology should also 
be more closely examined in a theoretical manner. This is necessary since states as units 
do not 'learn' . Particular governments have particular nuclear policies - states as units 
tend not to have, except to the extent that state policies tend to be partly constrained by 
previous government's decisions. To emphasise 'learning' and to de-emphasise political 
determinants seems an inverted prioritisation. Nye does refer to this theoretically in his 
most recent texts 199 but only briefly 'empirically,' and he certainly does not include any 
critical assessment of the politics or political economy of 'particular interest' interaction 
with the NNPR.
The new focus on 'learning' in international theory 2 00 seems to downgrade the 
importance of the politics and the political economy of interstate behaviour, merely 
suggesting that domestic political power structures may determine whose learning 
matters^Ol. it has a 'starting assumption' that states are unitary actors^02 p or 
example, Nye distinguishes 'cognitive change' and 'learning' from domestic politics and 
shifts in power, and cites as an example the disclosure by the U.S. of certain information 
to France about Pakistan's nuclear ambitions which led France to cancel its proposed sale 
to Pakistan of a plutonium reprocessing plant203# The connotation here is that the U.S.
198 J. Dahlitz, 'Proliferation and Confrontation', Australian Outlook, vol.33, no.l, 
1979, pp.27-44 at p.29.
199 Nye, 'Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security regimes', op.cit., p.400.
200 G. M odelski, 'Is World Politics Evolutionary Learning?', In t e rna t iona l  
Organisation.vol.44. no.l, 1990, pp.1-24.
201 Consensual perception and evolutionary attitudes by states or organisations as 'units' 
seem to be the focus: Haas, op.cit., pp.55 -59.
202 Nye, 'Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security regimes', op.cit., p.399.
203 ibid., pp. 378-9.
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taught France to comply with NNPR norms204 However, since the U.S. lifted most 
of its sanctions against Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the 
U.S. hardly maintained a consistently strong stand in support of the NNPR205 an(j geo_ 
political considerations seem to have been determinative. Similarly, knowledge of 
Israel's nuclear developments did not lead to strong U.S. condemnation of Israel nor to 
the suspension of U.S. foreign aid to that state. The temporary U.S. withdrawal from 
the IAEA in 1982 also hardly suggests an apolitical, 'learnt' commitment to the NNPR, 
nor do the differences in U.S. government policies under the Carter and Reagan 
adm inistrations^^. Professor Nye may also be partial towards the U.S. when he 
identifies other states, rather than the U.S (except regarding the Indian nuclear explosion) 
as having committed mistakes from which they 'learnt', for example, where he states: 
'..France helped Israel, and the Soviet Union helped China who in turn helped 
Pakistan'207 Successive U.S. governments certainly 'helped' indirectly in those 
situations too.
Similarly, in Smith's paper, where knowledge and learning are thought to be crucial, 
Smith undervalues the domestic politics inherent in that process of learning. Recent 
literature on the anti-nuclear peace movement and its electoral impact here should be 
essentiality alongside an analysis of other interests such as the military, the media, and 
political parties. Smith simply argues that states independently formed the opinion that 
nuclear weapons proliferation was undesirable, when the processes leading to that 
domestic and foreign policy position are complex. For example, Sweden, one of the 
early adherents to the NPT, in the mid-forties had a 'high-priority research programme'
204 Most of the examples in Nye's 'Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security regimes' 
purport to demonstrate Soviet learning, or (at p.376) 'the adaptation of Western concepts 
into Soviet thinking about intemtional relations' rather than learning by the U.S.
205 Smith and Cobban, op.cit., p.58.
206 ibid., pp. 55, 62-3, 66.
207 Nye, 'Arms Control After the Cold War', op.cit., p.55.
208 See for example G. Flynn and H. Rattinger (eds), The Public and Atlantic Defense. 
Croom Helm, London, 1985 which compares the peace movements in six West European 
states and the United States, cited in P.P. Everts, 'Where The Peace Movement Goes 
When It Disappears', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 45, no.9, 1989, pp.27 - 
30.
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examining the desirability of acquiring nuclear weaponry209? but a number of factors 
led to the abandonment of that program. These included the rise of domestic and 
international public opposition following disclosures about the research, the pressured 
development of a compromise Social Democrat policy on the issue to reconcile internal 
party divisions, followed by the gradual loss of political support for continuing research, 
the lack of a military service sponsor, and increased military doubts about the feasibility 
of the program in the light of other perceived force modernisation 'needs’; and the 
political isolation of the main proponent of nuclear research, the Forsvarets 
Forskningsanstalt (FOAJ^IO. Such influences and constraints are likely to vary greatly 
in different states, but they are also likely to have transnational links. But the point is that 
the eschewing of nuclear weaponry was a highly contingent political phenomena - not just 
a 'learnt' state response.
It can also be argued that Smith promotes rationalist Kantian belief in progress through 
cumulative knowledge and learning, when in the context of the NPT it is not clear that 
NNWS who endorsed the treaty intended to become NWS in any event; or conversely, 
that signatories to the NPT did not intend to acquire their nuclear technology under the 
treaty while simultaneously pursuing the NW option, as is evident with Iraq, Iran, Libya, 
North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan^ 11. Both Nye^l2 and Smith seem to suggest 
that all states were in the 'habit' of seeking NW status but that in view of the lessons 
being demonstrated by the superpowers, that path was abandoned.
The cause and effect issue also needs to be better developed in 'learning' theory especially 
regarding the 'feedback' effect of regimes on domestic and transnational political 
coalitions and states. The regime may be a source of 'negative' learning in that criticisms 
of states' failures to abide by NNPR norms may encourage political resolve to comply, 
such as in Europe where the 'peace movement' is an important factor pushing NNPR
209 W. Agrell, 'The Bomb That Never Was: The Rise and Fall of the Swedish Nuclear 
Weapons Programme', in N.P. Gleditsch and O. Njolstad, Arms Races: Technological 
and Political Dynamics. International Peace Research Institute, Oslo and Sage 
Publications, London, 1989, pp. 154-174.
210 ibid.
211 P. L. Leventhal, Latent and Blatant Proliferation: Does the NPT Work Against 
Either?, Conference Paper, Conference on Non-Proliferation in a Disarming World: 
Prospects for the 1990s, Groupe de Bellerive Vlth International Colloquium, Geneva, 
June 20-21, 1990.
212 Nye, "U.S.-Soviet Co-operation in a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.350.
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norms or positively, in that increasing numbers of states do seem to regard the NNPR as 
conferring 'security' benefits. This latter point is subject to many exceptions however. 
India for example, has been described as a state which has exploited its ambiguous 
nuclear status to extract international concessions and benefits^ ^  and this would not 
seem to be attributable to 'learning' under the regime. 'Learning' cannot be universalised 
and is subject to variables such as the forms of state under examination and domestic and 
regional political dynamics. Newly independent, highly 'nationalistic' states such as 
India which seem to regard high technology absolute weaponry as a source of status, 
with a nuclearised neighbour perceived as hostile, asserts a different 'knowledge' about 
nuclear politics than other states in less tense regions; and the domestic 'learning' by 
political coalitions differs markedly from that of the western anti-nuclear peace 
movement.
Liberal 'learning' theory also suggests that the 'most learned' states are NNPR 
participants, and that non-participants have no legitimate grievances about the treaty, nor 
have they 'learnt' about the effects of NW on the international system. Under this view 
the various arguments raised by states such as Ind ia^^ , and, till the eighties, West 
Germany, are not legitimate - they have just not learnt their lessons well. It can also be 
construed as quite paternalist: since many of the non-hegemonic powers took years to 
ratify the NPT, and many states still refuse to accede to it, they are being portrayed, by 
implication, as extremely slow-leamers^l^. It can also be seen as delineating 'legitimate 
discourses'. The knowing subscribe to the regime, the ignorant, learn. But this 
theoretical explanation for international behaviour cannot comfortably accommodate the 
views of those states unable or unwilling to learn^lö because it does not explain or 
analyse domestic and transnational political phenomena.
213 H. Gusterson, Orientalism and the Arms Race: An Analysis of the Neo-colonial 
Discourse on Nuclear Nonproliferation, Conference Paper, 2nd Ballyvaughn Conference 
on Discourse, Peace, Security and International Society, Ballyvaughn, Ireland, August, 
1988, p.29.
214 Canvassed for example in A. Kapur, India's Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and 
Decision Making. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1976.
215 About twenty-seven countries have refused to sign the NPT. These are listed in The 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 46, no.6, 1990, pp.24 -25.
216 Keeley, op.cit., p. 91.
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(b .3) International Fuel Cycle Evaluation
Nye and Smith agree that the NNPR was threatened in the seventies by the demonstration 
of Indian nuclear capability, the increase in the price of oil and expected increase in 
nuclear energy demand, and the increased sale of reprocessing facilities by France and 
West Germany to states with dubious non-proliferation stances^ ^ . Both correctly 
claim U.S. success in rallying countries to join the INFCE review which was complete in 
1980. Smith also suggests that despite these threats, and the decline of U.S. power in the 
nuclear arena, the regime was strengthened in the seventies. While identifying these 
threats neither Smith nor Nye take seriously, nor seem to regard as justified, the threat to 
the regime posed by vertical proliferation, except in casual asides. For both this may be 
because of a conviction that deterrence 'works'.
Nye's representation of the INFCE review which was held in 1978-80 can be only 
partially deconstructed. The evolution and impact of other measures such as the London 
Suppliers Group and the development of the Trigger List of sensitive nuclear exports will 
not be examined. Nye suggests that the Carter administration opened for re-examination 
the question of the desirability of nuclear energy production in breeder reactors and the 
recycling of plutonium in thermal reactors :
The approach that was chosen was designed to reinforce the existing regime, 
but not to accept the eroding status quo. It was important to shake others so 
that attention and action would be focused on refurbishing the regime, but to 
do so without coercion and with as little overt discrimination as 
possible .... 218
... INFCE helped the United States to set the agenda for other governments.
Moreover, it affected the process inside other governments..... While the
United States did not always agree with all the details of INFCE's answers, 
the most important point was that INFCE focused other countries' attention
217 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p. 29, cf. Nye, 'Nuclear 
Policy: the U.S. Approach to Nonproliferation - Are We Making Progress?', op.cit., 
p.39 where he suggests that the 'fuel cycle' was not the major concern. The term 'fuel 
cycle' suggests that the creation of nuclear energy is a natural event, a cycle, which is a 
form of pro-nuclear discourse since nuclear energy is in fact heavily dependant on 
technological intervention.
218 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.22.
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on a US question - nonproliferation.... [N]o country "won" and nearly all
countries gained some of their position, including for the United States, the 
core points against the recycling of plutonium in the current thermal 
reactors^
Thus Nye does acknowledge that some aspects of this multilateral review process were 
unsuccessful - such as the failure of its fuel bank proposal and the persistence of support 
for U.S.- opposed fast breeders. He does concede international hostility to the pre­
emptive 'unilateral' U.S. Nonproliferation Act of 1978 also. But even with such 
concessions Professor Nye may still be overstating the success of the U.S. INFCE 
initiative 220 He does not give much credence to the view that the U.S. unilaterally 
reworked the NPT along with dominant states - when others had proceeded till then on 
contrary understandings about its obligations-^ 1; and he does not mention that at 
INFCE the non-aligned bloc again raised the issue of the proposed Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty and the failure of the superpowers to disarm.
Other commentators are far less prone to inflate INFCE successes. Leventhal, for 
example, suggests that INFCE's failure to discourage plutonium and breeder programs, 
especially in Japan and Europe, has created major proliferation and terrorism 
concems222, especially in North-east Asia, since it has probably contributed to North 
and South Korea's apparent nuclear weapons acquisition policies.
Philip Gummett has also argued that INFCE failed to overcome major differences in 
countries' nuclear policies, despite acknowledging its harmonious deliberations and its 
success in heightening understanding of those differences. He has concluded that despite 
a high degree of consensus on many issues, significant differences remained especially 
regarding the economic viability of recycling plutonium in thermal reactors and the value 
of recycling in terms of assured supply and energy independence. He has also noted the 
criticisms by various countries of the restrictive policies adopted by the U.S from 1976; 
that Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Austria and Sweden called for the implementation 
of the proposed Comprehensive Test Ban223? an(j that a bloc 0f the jess developed
219 id.
220 p. Gummett, 'From NPT to INFCE : Developments in Thinking About Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation', International Affairs (London), vol. 57, no.4, 1981, pp. 549 -567.
221 Johnson-Freese, op.cit.
222 Leventhal, op.cit., p.6.
223 Gummett, op.cit., p.563.
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states (India, Brazil and Argentina) criticised the conference for perpetuating double 
standards by excluding from discussion the question of vertical proliferation^^ Again 
this tension, and the significant consequences of the failure of the U.S. to achieve its 
objectives erode regime theory claims. The fact that financial disincentives have 
constrained recycling programs is an independent causative agent outside the regime.
224 ibid., p.564.
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(b.4) NPT Review Conferences
In giving minimal attention to the failure of the superpowers to achieve substantial 
progress in disarmament negotiation both Nye and Smith have downplayed a major 
source of tension within the regime. Both largely ignore the criticisms of the high levels 
of superpower armament under deterrence made at various NPT review conferences, 
except with fleeting references. Nye has acknowledged in one article which does not 
expressly use regime theory that the failure of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to disarm 
may contribute to the collapse of the NNPR but he there suggested that superpower 
alliance guarantees 'indicates that their Article VI obligations cannot be interpreted as 
simple disarmament'225. Again he justifies the failure to disarm with reference to 
'stable' and extended deterrence. This has been criticised above. Both focus on the 
effectiveness of supply-side restrictions under the NNPR and the problem of horizontal 
proliferation, rather than on non-supplier concerns about superpower nuclear stockpiles.
The Review Conferences on the NPT are traditionally regarded as a yardstick by which 
the strength of the regime can be assessed, and the final communiques of the conference 
are important documents which record officially member states' assessments of the 
regime. They have reflected differences in perceptions about the priorities in the treaty, 
and both Nye and Smith tend to reflect the perceptions of the supplier states - that fuel 
cycle security against diversion to military use is the most important. At the review 
conferences there has been general agreement that Articles I and II have been faithfully 
adhered to, but the lack of substantive progress in superpower disarmament and thus the 
failure to meet the demands of Article VI, has been a constant problem. Even at the first 
conference, concern was expressed by NNWS about the lack of progress in 
disarmament. In 1975 the superpowers were criticised strongly for their failure to 
disarm226 while in 1978 at the first Special Session on Disarmament a declaration urged 
superpower disarmament^^
The 1980 second review conference again affirmed the success of the NPT in attracting 
membership and in preventing proliferation but participants from the Group of 77 (G-
225 Nye, 'NPT: The Logic of Inequality', op.cit., p.128; see also Nye, 'Arms Control 
After the Cold War', op.cit., pp.46 -47.
226 Shaker, op.cit., pp.581-2.
227 ibid., pp.644, 647.
57.
77)228 condemned the lack of progress in superpower disarmament. A number of 
developing countries also objected to the restrictive export policies toward NPT members 
by some NWS, following the implementation of the restrictive London Supplier Group 
guidelines, when nuclear trade and co-operation had proceeded with some non-parties to 
the NPT, including a few comparatively more industrially advanced. The 1980 review 
conference failed to produce a consensus final document.
The 1985 third review conference reflected a better consensus but again the failure of the 
NWS to progress with disarmament was condemned strongly. The conference affirmed 
the value of the NPT, IAEA safeguards, the need for stability in long-term supplies, and 
the need for mutual consent before the re-negotiation of supply agreements, but the 
U.S.and the U.K. were criticised for their refusal to negotiate on the proposed 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty^29 The G-77, non-aligned and neutral participants 
condemned the NWS for their lack of arms reductions, increased arms spending and 
space race research. Concern was also expressed about the lack of the application of full- 
scope safeguards'^  to non-NPT countries which placed only imported items under 
IAEA control. A nuclear testing moratorium and stockpile freeze, and reductions in NW 
arsenals were also urged. According to Power, because of the slump in the nuclear 
power industry; the imminent U.S.-S.U. Intermediate Nuclear Forces summit; the less 
'developed' countries' debt crisis and the softening of non-NPT state stances on the 
treaty, a consensus declaration was finally produced^ 1. Australia's then Ambassador 
for Disarmament to the United Nations, Richard Butler, has also been credited with
228 The post-1967 U.N. and especially the less developed countriess 'bloc' in the 
Committee on Trade and Development.
229 J. Goldblat, 'The Third Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty', Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol.17, no.l, 1986, pp. 13-27 at p.13. See also D. 
Albright and A. Carothers, 'Fragile Consensus on Non-Proliferation Treaty', The 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol.41, no.ll, 1985, pp.8-10.
230 These require all nuclear facilities in a state to come under IAEA supervision to 
ensure that fissionable material is not used for weapons manufacture: J. Dahlitz, Nuclear 
Arms Control with effective international instruments. McPhee Gribble Publishers, 
Melbourne, 1983, p.215.
231 P.F. Power, 'The mixed state of non-proliferation: the NPT Review Conference and 
beyond', Journal of International Affairs. Summer 1986, pp. 447 -491.
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facilitating that consensus by helping resolve differences both over the wording of the 
final nuclear testing statement and between the Iranian and Iraqi delegations^^.
The 1990 fourth review conference recently failed to reach sufficient consensus to enable 
a final communique to be issued, although apparently ninety-five per cent of a final 
declaration had been agreed^33 Nearly all speakers stressed the importance of the 
treaty and some delegations had strengthened their endorsement of it^34  At that 
conference, in the First Committee, a number of non-aligned states led by the Mexican 
delegation insisted on a firm U.S. commitment to ending nuclear testing, citing Article VI 
of the NPT, although such a commitment was contrary to U.S. policy. However after 
protracted negotiations and the endorsement of a compromise text by most of the non- 
aligned countries235, the insistence by other delegations that the final paragraph of the 
U.S. proposal which referred to a joint U.S.-Soviet commitment to step-by-step 
negotiations be included caused that consensus to fo u n d e r^ 6 In other respects some 
post-conference salvaging of the conference agreement has been pursued with the IAEA 
General Conference officially recognising the conference language on NPT Articles III, 
IV and V, and their preambular paragraphs. Commentators have suggested that this 
failure is indicative of an international polarisation of views about nuclear disarmament, 
despite recent bilateral agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union237 This 
polarisation is unlikely to be resolved in the near future given the intransigence of the
232 Anon, 'How Australia Saved the NPT: An Interview with Richard Butler', Pacific 
Research, vol.2, no .l, 1989, pp.3 - 5.
233 Australia. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'The Fourth Non-Proliferation 
Treaty Review Conference', op.cit., p.3.
234 Notably West Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and Australia: Van 
Doren and Bunn, op.cit., p.8.
235 Mexico, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuala and Yugoslavia.
236 The Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons: An assessment by the Delegation of Mexico, Typescript, 20 
September 1990.
237 H. Porteous, 'NPT fails to agree on inspections', Jane's Defence W eek ly . 29 
September 1990, p.542.
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U.S. and the U.K. over nuclear testing, despite the apparent dissolution of the Cold War 
as the major impetus for international tension^ 8
The frustrations of a number of non-aligned states about the nuclear arms race has led to 
a proposal by six parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, viz, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri 
Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, to propose an amendment to and extension of the 
Partial Test Ban Treaty so that testing is outlawed. The requisite number of states have 
agreed to this motion but the depositary governments, the Soviet Union, Britain and the 
United States, must accede to any such resolution before it can be carried into effect. 
Both Britain and the U.S. are highly unlikely to support the motion, effectively vetoing 
it^39# This setback for the non-aligned is likely to harden resolve to strengthen the NPT 
regarding its disarmament obligations at the 1995 review conference.
(c) Boundary Construction
The indeterminacy of 'regimes', as argued by critics of 'regime theory' may be 
demonstrable by the difficulty in determining what actually comprises the 'regime' and 
what obligations it creates. In this respect I will examine what Nye and Smith omit as 
constituent elements of the 'regime'. Neither examine Euratom and U.S. sanctions policy 
(as distinct from legislation^^), when both agree that domestic legislation comprises 
part of a 'regime'. This constitutes a significant omission which may inflate U.S. 
performance and 'hegemony' within the 'regime'.
238 The U.S stresses that it sees progress toward a CTBT as a 'step by step' process and 
that it has not yet identified the next step beyond the signing of verification protocols by 
the U.S.a nd the Soviet Union at the recent Washington summit: D. Pitts Lehman Calls 
the NPT Review Conference Successful, USIA Staff Writer, Typescript: Story 
EP2140918, 18 September, 1990.
239 Anon, 'From The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: July/August 1990', SANA 
Update, no.88, 1990, p.13.
240 Smith refers to the International Financial Institutions Act 1977 regarding the 
suspension of export-import loans but its operation is not examined: Smith, op.cit., 
p.259.
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( c . l )  Euratom
The fact that neither Nye nor Smith examines the European Atomic Energy Agency 
(Euratom) as a constituent element of the NNPR^41 is another sign of their U.S.- 
centric approaches, since European assertiveness^42 has prevented an IAEA safeguards 
monopoly. The implications of the importance of Euratom have recently been realised in 
allegations that suppliers' end-use restrictions have been avoided within Euratom's 
jurisdiction by the manipulative exchange of the state-of-origin 'flags' attached to 
supplied nuclear material243? thereby enabling intended safeguards to be avoided.
Euratom was formed at the same time as the European Economic Community, in 1957, in 
anticipation of the need for alternative energy supplies for community members. It was 
also to provide scientific co-operation in keeping with the E.E.C. objective of regional 
political co-operation244 Euratom has been described as having a 'jealous attachment' 
to its system of safeguards^45^ which preceded those of the IAEA, and, in conformity 
with its treaty, it refuses to agree to any restrictions which would require discrimination
241 Nye refers to Euratom only briefly in the context of NPT negotiations: Nye, 'U.S.- 
Soviet Co-operation in the Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.342.
242 Ikenberry argues that that assertiveness prevented the attainment of many U.S. 
economic goals in the post-war years, thus defying current hegemon analysis: G.J. 
Ikenberry, 'Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony', Political Science Quarterly. 
vol.104, no.3, 1989, pp.375-400.
243 R. Leaver, 'Australian Safeguards: Can We Trust Euratom?', Pacific Research, 
vo l.l, no .l, 1988, pp.6-8.
244 EURATOM was formed in 1957 (operational 1 January 1958) as part of the move 
towards European integration. Euratom seeks the co-operation of members states in 
peaceful nuclear research. The European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN, or 
Conseil europeen pour la recherche nucleaire) was formed in 1954 as a regional attempt to 
match pure U.S. nuclear research which was beyond the budgets of individual states. 
Founding members of CERN were Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and 
Yugoslavia: Shaker, op.cit., pp.344-8 and see R. Leaver, The Nukem Scandal and 
Australian Uranium Safeguards, Seminar Paper, Department of International Relations, 
Australian National University, September, 1988, p.7.
245 Shaker, op.cit., p.695.
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between or amongst Euratom members246 This prevents action being taken against 
France for example, which refuses to accede to the NPT but which has agreed to act in 
conformity with its obligations. In 1958 the U.S. recognised Euratom safeguards by 
agreement, and it also agreed not to demand inspection of the uses made of U.S.-origin 
materials and equipment. U.S. nuclear co-operation agreements with Euratom have 
attracted a Presidential waiver regarding the physical security of U.S. nuclear items 
exported to Euratom until at least 1988, despite the inconsistency with NNPR
requirements^^ that this practice represents.
IAEA-Euratom relations were discussed during NPT negotiations, and although Euratom 
undertook to liaise with the IAEA on creating a compatible safeguards system and on 
possible IAEA assistance to Euratom, it was not until 1977 that an agreed declaration of 
co-operation was put into e ffec t^  8 Negotiations were constrained by the active 
'Ostpolitik' of the time, by a concern that some French nuclear activities which were 
covered by Euratom safeguards would not be by the NPT as France was a non­
participant, by the International Atomic Energy Agency's concern that Euratom weakened 
IAEA universality^^ ancj by Euratom reliance on U.S. and U.K. nuclear supplies.
Euratom nuclear regulation differs significantly from that of the IAEA. It is controlled by 
the European Parliament and its safeguards policies are created by the Euratom Treaty. 
Unlike the IAEA, Euratom does not have individual safeguards agreements with member 
states and the Euratom Commission can states in breach of safeguards to the European 
Court of Justice^O Nor do Euratom safeguards discriminate between NWS and 
NNWs. The Commission of the European Communities administers its safeguards in 
accordance with the declarations of intended use made by E.E.C. members and their 
firms, with safeguards being applied only to those materials, installations and activities 
designated as intended for use for non-military purposes only. Thus in contrast to NPT 
safeguards, which apply fully to NNWS and not automatically to NWS, Euratom
246 Greig, op.cit., p. 110.
247 Schwartz, op.cit., p.25.
248 Shaker, op.cit., p.703.
249 Japan also has a separate system of safeguards: Shaker, op.cit., p.707. As a 
nonproliferation measure, under agreements for the sale of Soviet nuclear reactors spent 
fuel must be returned to the Soviet Union: D.A.V. Fischer, 'Eastern Europe after Pax 
Sovietica', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 46, no.6, 1990, pp.23, 26-27.
250 ibid., p.26.
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members' nuclear materials are subject to safeguards if they are declared to be intended 
for peaceful use, but not if declared to be intended for military use25 1. Euratom is also 
usually the conduit for relations between member states and the IAEA , but there is also 
provision for joint inspections of nuclear facilities.
(c.2) U.S. Sanctions Policy and Bilateral Nuclear 
Co-operation Agreements
The construction of the boundaries and constituent elements of the NNPR in Nye and 
Smith's papers preserves the sanctify of U.S. policies, for neither critically assesses the 
exercise of U.S. sanctions policy as a major potential contributor to the NNPR, when the 
U.S. as a key international aid provider, U.S. sanctions policy is crucial. Nye notes only 
in passing that U.S. 'sticks' have tended not to be applied252 and he explains that 
difficulties arise when nonproliferation objectives have to be balanced with other aspects 
of U.S. foreign policy253 Smith only refers to a F16 deal with Pakistan in 
passing254 This would seem to be a major textual contradiction, for far from the 
'regime' altering the perception held by the U.S. of its 'national interest', as one would 
expect under regime theory, the U.S. has avoided using all available measures, some of 
which are superior to NPT and IAEA measures^5  ^ t0 encourage compliance with that 
regime.
Before nuclear reactors or nuclear fuel can be exported from the U.S. a bilateral peaceful 
nuclear co-operation agreement must be concluded in accordance with the U.S. Atomic 
Energy A ct, or if specified provisions are not included in the agreement, then the 
President is required to seek specific Congressional approval. The President is also 
required to determine that the agreement would promote and not impede 'common 
defense and security'256 jn addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is 
required to issue an independent licence for such exports, after receiving Executive
251 Article 84 of the Euratom Treaty exempts nuclear materials intended for the purposes 
of defence: Shaker, op.cit., p.691.
252 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation regime', op.cit., p.20.
253 ibid., pp.31-32.
254 Smith, op.cit., p.271.
255 Schwartz, op.cit.
256 ibid., pp.23-24.
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branch endorsement that the export would 'not be inimical to the common defense and 
security'25 7 The President however, has the power to authorise the export where 
withholding the licence is considered 'seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United 
States nonproliferation objectives, or would otherwise jeopardise the common defense 
and security'. This Presidential veto of NRC findings is then open to concurrent 
Congressional veto^S 8 jn addition, under the Atomic Energy Act, the Foreign 
Assistance Act and the Export-Import Bank Act sanctions can be applied if states generate 
proliferation concerns, for example, by importing unsafeguarded enrichment technology. 
However, the President can be authorized by Congress to waive the sanctions259
These procedures are very much at the margins of the NNPR, but are significant 
nevertheless. Presidential waivers of sanctions in relation to Pakistan and Israel are 
probably the most blatant examples of the susceptibility of U.S. nonproliferation policy to 
broader geo-political concerns, for despite evidence of the acquisition of sensitive nuclear 
transfers by both states, U.S. sanctions have not been applied consistently.
U.S. aid to Pakistan has been suspended in the past because of Pakistan's receipt of 
unsafeguarded nuclear exports, but following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, 
in 1981 Congress waived aid sanctions against Pakistan until 1987. A SU.S.3.2 billion 
aid package was also approved then^60 j n 1985 Congress required annual 
Presidential certifications that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device, and 
that U.S. aid would reduce the risk of it acquiring one. After the conviction of an alleged 
Pakistani agent for procuring illegal exports for Pakistan, legislative amendments allowed 
sanctions to be imposed against any non-nuclear weapon state which exported sensitive 
commodities to Pakistan. In 1988, despite the U.S. conviction of another alleged 
Pakistani procurement agent for nuclear export violations, the President waived new 
sanctions, extended his waiver over Pakistan's earlier receipt of unsafeguarded 
enrichment technology, and Congress approved another $U.S. 480 million aid 
package^ 1. This was apparently against the advice of the US director of the Arms
257 ibid., p.24.
258 ibid., p.25.
259 ibid., p.51.
260 G.C. Smith and H. Cobban, 'A Blind Eye to Nuclear Proliferation', Foreign Affairs. 
vol.68, no.3, 1989, pp.53-70 at p.58.
261 Schwartz, op.cit., p.58.
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Control and Disarmament Agency who was concerned about the U.S. non-proliferation
image2 6 2 .
Further tensions in U.S. non-proliferation policy have arisen arise out of South Asian 
geo-political concerns. The continuation of U.S. aid is alleged to be one of the factors 
enabling the reissue of Presidential certification (as in 1985, 1986 and 1987) that Pakistan 
does not possess a nuclear weapon, since conventional military aid has been thought to 
enhance regional deterrence. (Viewed from the Pakistan perspective: it has been able to 
extract more aid by playing its nuclear card). A contributing factor has also been that the 
refusal of such a certification would exacerbate Indian-Pakistani tensions and strengthen 
Indian domestic support for an overt nuclear weapons program263 Pakistan has been 
reported to be seeking conventional military aid elsewhere on the assumption that U.S. 
aid was likely to be reduced264 Aid has in fact been suspended recently.
Israel, also traditionally favoured in U.S. policy for strategic and domestic political 
reasons, has also benefitted from a lax sanctions policy in relation to its development of 
nuclear capabilities. Intelligence about that capability in 1968, for example, did not 
impede the delivery of F-4 Phantom jets to Israel in that year. Those jets have a dual 
capability for transporting conventional and nuclear warheads265 jn succeeding years, 
the U.S. congress continued to approve various aid packages to Israel without insisting 
on Israeli accession to the NPT, and some proposed legislative amendments to sanctions 
legislation were withdrawn following warnings that they might affect Israeli aid^66 
Israeli's refusal to accede to the NPT now may threaten the regime for Arab states see 
Israel as a 'free rider' on the system, benefitting from regional accessions. According to 
Simpson, to ensure the survival of the NPT beyond 1995, Israel may have to sign it, 
close down its Dimona facility, accept IAEA full-scope safeguards or join a regional 
nuclear-free zone267
262 Smith and Cobban, op.cit., p.58.
263 ibid., p.60.
264 B. Boswell, 'US aid stumbles over Pakistan bomb', The Australian. December 3, 
1990, p.9.
265 Smith and Cobban, op.cit., p.61.
266 ibid., p.63.
267 Simpson, op.cit., p.39.
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An examination of the myriad bi-lateral nuclear co-operation agreements concluded 
around the world could also undermine some of the broad-brush representations of the 
NNPR. As Keeley has argued, treaties form a major basis for 'expectations in space, 
time, subject matter, and rules'268 An analysis of the contents of these agreements and 
the extent of interstate compliance would facilitate regime analysis since it might 'uncover 
systematic differences in treaty contents among different groups - for example, Non- 
Proliferation Treaty signatories as opposed to non-signatories, or members of the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group as opposed to non-members'269 However, measuring the extent of 
compliance with such regulations may be difficult, not only because of scarce and 
obsolete data, questionable state practice in complying with treaties, language 
v a r ia t io n s '^ ,  and the extent of secrecy enshrouding the nuclear industry, but also 
because of limitations on the right of citizens to seek the review of such agreements. 
Most 'regime' theory articles focus exclusively on U.S. nuclear export policies and 
although there public review is likely to more accessible than in other states, despite 
constrain ts^  1, other states' export policies should be assessed in practice.
Nevertheless, the merits of such an exercise are apparent. Several examples are available 
of U.S. agreements which were very much at the margins of the NNPR, but which make 
significant inroads on NNPR norms. In 1978 Japan's Kansai Electric Power sought 
U.S. agreement for the retransfer of 29 tons of spent fuel to France for reprocessing, and 
although this became inconsistent with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, the 
U.S. executive authorised the retransfer. The reasons were that the Japanese contract 
with France had been concluded in 1975, before the Act was passed; public assurances 
had been given in Japan that the spent fuel would be retransferred, and penalties would 
have accrued if the contract had been breached. The U.S. was also sensitive to
268 J.F. Keeley, 'Coding Treaties: An Example from Nuclear Cooperation', International 
Studies Quarterly, vol.29,1985, pp. 103-108 at p.104.
269 ibid.
270 ibid., p.106.
271 For example in Cranston v. Reagan 611 F. Supp. 247 (D.C.D.C.) 1985 the U.S. 
President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, the Director of the U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Chairman and members of the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission successfully opposed an application by three members of the 
U.S. Congress and six public interest organisations to have U.S. nuclear co-operation 
agreements with Sweden and Norway judicially reviewed for alleged inconsistency with 
the U.S. Atomic Energy Act. The Court, in line with earlier decisions, held the issues to 
be non-justiciable political questions: cited in Schwartz, op.cit., p.5.
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jeopardising multilateral negotiations over INFCE272 Later again Congress criticised a 
1985 nuclear co-operation agreement with China and a 1987 agreement with Japan , on 
alleged defense and security grounds. Congress also criticised the exercise of the 
Presidential veto and authorisation for the export of nuclear fuel to two U.S. supplied 
reactors in India, when the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had opposed the export. 
Only one house of Congress voted to override the latter authorisation^3 That 
opposition had arisen in relation to the Indian fuel import because India refuses to accept 
full-scope safeguards over all its peaceful nuclear activities, but the Executive branch 
argued that India was within a grace period under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.
These Presidential vetoes and Congressional concerns again demonstrate that broad-brush 
theorising may overlook significant departures from identified NNPR norms.
212 Nye? 'u .s . Policy on Reprocessing of U.S.-origin Nuclear Material', op.cit., p.44. 
273 Schwartz, op.cit., p.25.
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CHAPTER 3
MISCELLANEOUS DECONSTRUCTIONS
Derridean 'deconstructive' technique attempts to challenge a discourse by identifying both 
the hierarchical oppositions on which it relies and by identifying the rhetorical devices 
which ground the argument^^. in Nye and Smith's texts, the represented stability of 
the superpower nuclear arsenal as against the alleged risks attendant upon horizontal 
proliferation will be examined. In this respect the 'orientalist' aspects of the texts can be 
identified. Derridean methodology also locates contradictions within the text which tend 
to undermine its conclusions. Again the contradictions within Nye and Smith's texts 
regarding the possession of nuclear weaponry are identified. Ideological and conceptual 
values are also examined to show how terms have been restricted in their meaning or tied 
to particular operations within the text so as to 'ground' the text to a coherent meaning or 
conceptual hierarchy. In this respect pro-nuclear language is identified.
(i) Contradictions
In focusing on the Atoms for Peace program for the foundation of the NNPR, Nye 
clearly simplifies and overstates early U.S. policy commitments to nonproliferation. He 
has examined this period more critically in one recent article^^, 5ut other publications 
do not detract from the central contradiction in some texts - that the regime was created 
when the U.S. was actively encouraging proliferation. Smith is right on this point - that 
at the time that the U.S. was the nuclear hegemon, proliferation was at its most active. 
Professor Nye does not mention in his 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime' piece, 
for example, that developments in the mid-fifties, from when he dates the regime, nuclear 
co-operation between the U.S. and its allies276 was motivated by a perceived need to
274 Culler, op.cit; Balkin, op.cit. and S. Levinson, 'Law as Literature', Texas Law 
Review, vol.60, no.3, 1982, pp.373 -403.
275 Nye, 'U.S. -Soviet Cooperation in a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit.
276 See for example 'The Declaration of Common Purpose by Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan of Britain and President Eisenhower', October 25, 1957; 'The Joint 
Communique Issued on Discussions Between President Kennedy Prime Minister 
Macmillan', December 18-21, 1962, and 'The United States Note to the United Kingdom 
on an Agreement for the Supply of United States Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles to 
the United Kingdom', February 22, 1958, reproduced in A.M. Schleshinger, Jr. (Gen.
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develop national 'defensive' nuclear capabilities against the threat of 'international 
communism'. Nye considers the contradiction between the evidence of early proliferation 
and his case for the alleged formation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime to be 
acceptable because in his analysis, superpower deterrence is important for international 
'peace', and the early diffusion of nuclear capability can be seen as part of the creation of 
a nuclear 'balance' (even if highly imbalanced initially). This assumption about the 
importance of deterrence marginalises the concerns of the non-aligned and (then) 'eastern 
bloc' parties to the NPT.
Nye's text is contradictory regarding the impact of the possession of NW. He argues 
that NNWS should remain assured that the possession of a nuclear weapon does not 
confer general power in international affairs277 ^ut then constructs arguments around 
the proposition that the U.S. was and is able to fashion a consensus about non­
proliferation partly because it used to be a powerful military ally. He says that the 
stability of the NNPR became threatened by the erosion of that U.S. power and by the 
alleged weakening of U.S. security guarantees for former 'client states' as U.S. foreign 
policy turned inward after the U.S. defeat in Vietnam278 jf nuclear weapons are seen 
by less developed states as a cheap absolute weapon which can compensate for a decline 
in foreign military 'protection' surely nuclear weapons do confer power. As a corollary, 
U.S. possession of NW had conferred substantial benefits. The weakness of the broader 
argument about nuclear security guarantees under the NNPR has been noted above.
The existence of an extensive global nuclear infrastructure which implicates aligned states 
in superpower arms racing and war fighting scenarios^ 9 seems to be a central 
contradiction in both Nye and Smiths' texts which needs to explored in any analysis of 
the NNPR. The issue of stationed NW in contributing to regional tensions under 
superpower targeting strategies tends to undermine Smith's claim that states participated 
in the regime because of the perception of the effects of nuclear weapons. If deleterious 
and proliferation should be curbed, why have so many aligned states been so integrally 
involved in modem nuclearism?
Ed.) and R. Dallek (ed.), The Dynamics of World Power: A Documentary History of 
United States Foreign Policy 1945-1973. Volume 1 Part 2. Western Europe. Chelsea 
House, New York, 1983, pp.298-301, 745 -747 and pp.337 -339 respectively.
277 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p. 36.
278 ibid., pp. 19-20.
279 W. Arkin and R. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields. Ballinger Press, Cambridge, 
1985, especially ch.l.
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(ii) Orientalism?
Nye's assumptions about stability under deterrence may also reflect the attitudes Edward 
Said has identified in 'orientalist'280 discourse although Nye denies any 'racist' 
in te rn a l. He argues that deterrence is more likely to fail in 'third world' states for a 
number of reasons. These include the latter's 'political instability', risk of coups and lack 
of civil control over the military, their limited possession of and experience with nuclear 
command and control systems, and because of opponents' pre-emptive advantages 
against new nuclear programs^82 (presumably because of the lack of a second-strike 
capability283). He also suggests that with greater proliferation, the risk of deliberate or 
accidental use of nuclear weaponry, and terrorist theft of nuclear material substantially 
increases284. in his earlier writing, Nye implies that U.S. weapons nuclear technology 
is 'safe', contrary to that of many other states^85
There are various flaws in these arguments. Regarding nuclear technology, much of that 
which has been 'transferred' to 'Third World' states draws on western expertise, 
personnel and materials, so if there are major inadequacies in its management, western- 
trained or western-recruited staff should bear some responsibility. The implicit 
assumption that the technology in the 'developed' states can render nuclear weaponry 
'safe' belies the evidence that a large number of nuclear-related accidents have occurred in 
the U.S. and that many 'sensitive' nuclear items have been lost in 'developed' states. For 
both 'developed' and 'developing' states the risk of fallout causing widespread 
contamination and the simple abhorrence of nuclear warfare render domestic or regional
280 Edward Said's critique of western representations of the East defines 'Orientalist' 
discourse as that which is 'racist, ignorant of the domestic political dynamics of its 
subjects and which denies the East a history - seeing it rather as the epigone of a lost 
greatness: E. Said, Orientalism. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1978.
281 Nye? 'NPT: Logic of Inequality', op.cit., p.126.
282 ibid., pp.126 -7.
283 G. Quester, 'Nuclear Proliferation and Stability' in D. Brito and M. Intriligator 
(eds.), Strategies For Managing Nuclear Proliferation. Lexington Books, 1982 cited in 
Gusterson, op.cit., p.12.
284 ibid., and Nye, 'Arms Control After the Cold War', op.cit., p.55.
285 Nye, 'Planning a Safeguardable Nuclear Future', op.cit.
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detonation highly unlikely. But even if such detonation were to occur, surely the smaller 
arsenals of the less 'developed' states which lack global targeting would cause less
catastrophe?^^
Regarding political control, if less 'developed' states do lack the capacity to control 
nuclear weaponry, or do not have the same command, communication and intelligence 
facilities as more developed states^87 this may not necessarily lead to a greater 
likelihood of nuclear war than if decisions were being taken under the seignorage of a 
superpower. Many regional conflicts have been exacerbated by superpower involvement 
in the past, and to date threats to use nuclear weapons have been issued primarily by the 
U.S. and the S.U. Destabilising ethnic conflict also occurs in 'developed' states, such as 
the recent ethnic conflict amongst various Soviet nationalities, and the British race riots of 
the mid-eighties, but there nuclear resolution of the conflict is equally unlikely. Finally, 
the assumption that governments in the more 'developed' states are more stable and less 
prone to coups or revolutions must surely be questioned in the light of political unrest in 
France in 1968, and more recently by the social movements of the eighties which have 
toppled the governments of industrialised Eastern Europe. The argument that nuclear war 
may be more likely in 'Third World' states because of the comparatively tenuous control 
of the military by civilian governments also overlooks the fact that technological failings 
such as 'failed computer chips, flocks of geese, even the rising of the moon, have 
triggered false alarms in America's high technology early warning system'288? ancj that 
automated technology minimises the need for human control. Moreover, some 
'threshold' third world states such as Brazil, which until recently have been military 
dictatorships, have not been identified with irresponsible regional behaviour. The loss of 
sensitive nuclear material, such as a shipment of yellowcake allegedly intercepted by 
Israel, has also been a U.S. 'responsibility'.
286 Gusterson, op.cit., p. 15.
287 N y e, 'Arms Control After the Cold War', op.cit., p.55.
288 ibid.
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(iii) Language
(a) Nuclear 'Sharing'
Part of the 'hard-sell' of the U.S. 'Atoms for Peace' program was the promised economic 
benefits of nuclear technology, (or as Nye states, assistance with the nuclear energy 
'needs'^89), an(j that assumption continues under IAEA assistance today. But for 
whom is this 'peace'? Economic growth does not necessarily lead to an equitable 
distribution of the proceeds, neither does it mean ecological security, or civil liberties 
protections^^. Discussion of the implications of uranium mining for indigenous 
inhabitants or owners of mineral-rich lands, and the occupational health implications of 
the industry for workers tend to be less discussed, while nuclear technology has been 
disseminated under bilateral agreements for military purposes not involving nuclear 
explosions, such as atomic propulsion for aircraft and military submarines^ 1. These 
concerns are marginalised in 'regime' discourse^^.
In the nineteen-fifties the Atoms for Peace program recommended the creation of an 
international atomic energy agency for the international control of nuclear commerce, and 
the creation of a 'fissile' pool to which NWS were expected to contribute uranium and 
fissile material. The IAEA is discussed below. It was not expected that the 'superiority' 
of the U.S. stockpile would be threatened by this initiative.
Again concerning the alleged 'beginning' of the NNPR, the Atoms for Peace program can 
be critically assessed. In 1952, the U.S. administration had commissioned a study from 
a panel of consultants on disarmament, under Robert Oppenheimer, but that panel's 1953 
Candor Report provided a bleak outlook about the growing dispersion of nuclear 
capabilities and the lack of accountability over fissile materials. Patterson explains that in
289 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.17.
290 See for example: R.W. Ayers, 'Policing Plutonium: The Civil Liberties Fallout', 
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, vol.10, 1975, pp.369-443; R. 
Refshauge, 'Civil liberties in the nuclear society', Legal Services Bulletin, vol.2, no.8, 
1977, pp.269-271.
291 See for example, the Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom 
for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes, July 3, 
1958, reproduced in Schleshinger, op.cit., pp. 339-346.
292 They are however, examined in detail in the Ford-Mitre study on nuclear energy - a 
study which Professor Nye was earlier involved with.
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response, Eisenhower insisted on a more positive promotion of the nuclear industry 
which emphasised the potentiality of 'peaceful' nuclear applications and the highly 
rhetorical 'Atoms for Peace' program was launched shortly thereafter^93 The program 
title, was however, value-laden as all language is. Just like the names given to many 
nuclear power plants, such as Rhapsodie, Phenix (sic) and Joyo294^ the 'Atoms for 
Peace' title was designed in part to help sell U.S. nuclear technology abroad. 'Atoms', in 
addition to denoting physical entities, suggested building blocks - the nuclei of 
development, while '[F] or' suggested that atoms were usable, under control, able to be 
directed towards 'Peace', downplaying accident risks. 'Peace' in the context of 'atoms', 
and the program objectives, suggests the use of nuclear technology for non-military 
purposes and to avoid war; industrial development and nuclear trade expansion. The 
language also has certain spiritual or psychological overtones - the opposite of existential 
angst, guilt and fear which was also prevalent in the 1950s^95 At the U.N., then 
President Eisenhower also claimed that peaceful power from atomic energy was no dream 
of the future, but a proven capability, open to development and transformation into 
'universal, efficient and economic usage'296 The IAEA was to be responsible for 
mobilising experts to apply atomic energy for agriculture, medicine and other peaceful 
activities. Eisenhower's speech did not address the links between 'peaceful' nuclear 
capabilities and proliferation which had been identified by the earlier Acheson-Lilenthal 
Plan, nor the Candor Report recommendations urging public disclosure about the dangers 
and extent of both nuclear arms stockpiles and the growing nuclear arms anarchy.
Although he does acknowledge that initially nuclear energy was oversold, Nye accepts 
this positive imagery, describing the program as an offer by the U.S. to 'share the fruits 
of its then long technological lead'297 The metaphor of natural abundance or
293 W.C. Patterson, The Plutonium Business and the spread of the bomb. Paladin 
Books, London, 1984, pp. 23 -25.
294 ibid., pp.54-59.
295 P. Boyer, Bv the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of 
the Atomic Age. Pantheon Books, New York, 1985.
296 President Dwight D. Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' Address to the United Nations 
General Assembly, December 8, 1953, reproduced in R.C. Williams and P.L. Cantelon 
(eds), The American Atom : A Documentary History of Nuclear Policies from the 
Discovery of Fission to the Present 1939-84. University of Pennysylvania Press, 
Philadephia, 1984, pp.104 -111 at 110.
297 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.17.
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cornucopia sanitises the technology. To share fruits implies the distribution of a useful 
plant product, an enjoyable, ultimately edible creation of nature; dessert, sweetness, 
celebration and wealth. Many would argue to the contrary that the primary 'fruit' of 
nuclear technology - plutonium nuclear waste - presents an enormous disposal problem 
and is linked inextricably to proliferation^^. Veteran nuclear commentator Wohlstetter 
has also recognised 'sharing' in the nuclear context as 'an appropriately benign word ... 
which has overtones of fairness, Christian charity and right behaviour'299 Rendered 
invisible by this imagery are the dramatic and often adverse economic and social 
implications of the importation of sophisticated nuclear technology for less developed 
states.3 00
(b) The Treaty of Tlatelolco
Nye suggests that the Treaty of Tlatelolco 'helps to fill the normative gap' left by 
significant states not ratifying the NPT^Ol.
This downgrading of the Treaty of Tlatelolco to a 'regional counterpart' of the NPT 
protects the privileged status of the NPT, and it has been noted above that the 
superpowers are credited primarily for the development of that treaty. Negotiations on 
the former treaty arose from concerns held by various Latin American states about the 
Cuban missile crisis and from their aversion to great power rivalry in the region^^2
298 Plutonium derives from uranium-238 but acquires an additional neutron within a 
nuclear reactor. Plutonium-239 can be used for fission bombs or fast-breeder reactors. It 
has a half-life of 24,000 years: Stephenson and Weal, op.cit., p.124.
299 Wohlstetter, A. 'Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N + 1 Country', Foreign Affairs. 
vol.39, no.3,1961, pp.355-387 at p.356.
300 D. Poneman, 'Nuclear Policies in Developing Countries', International Affairs 
(London), vol.57, no.4, 1981, pp.568-584 at p.569.These include expense and likely 
foreign debt exacerbation; environmental risk, capital intensity and the 'need' to import 
skilled technicians to construct and operate the nuclear plant, which then is likely to 
become an enclave unlikely to have significant spin-off benefits for local industry beyond 
power generation, because of its technological 'sophistication'.
301 Nye, 'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p. 18; Nye, 'U.S.-Soviet 
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302 R.W. Jones, 'Atomic Diplomacy in Developing Countries', Journal of International 
Affairs, vol.34, no.l, 1980, pp.89 -117, at p.103.
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Negotiations were complete in 1967^03? before the NPT was finalised, and although a 
regional treaty, it was not a derivative of the NPT but followed other geographical 
nonproliferation t r e a t i e s ^ s u c h  as the Antarctic Treaty 1959. In 1964 Africa was 
declared a nuclear-free zone by the Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of 
African Unity; in 1964 the Second Conference of the Heads of State and Government of 
Non-Aligned Countries urged great powers not to proliferate NW; and in 1965 the U.N. 
Disarmament Commission requested the Geneva Committee on Disarmament to consider 
non-proliferation issues:, unilateral declarations, and treaties limiting the testing of nuclear 
w eapons^O ^. These others were not dependent on U.S. or Soviet sponsorship, 
although that assisted their finalisation, for they had diverse national origins, had and 
have varied memberships, and were concluded following detailed and protracted 
multilateral negotiations^^, leading some commentators to suggest that there may have 
been an emerging norm of customary international law against the development of nuclear 
weapons by non-nuclear weapon states^O^
Moreover, the Tlatelolco control system is more stringent than that of the IAEA for under 
the Tlatelolco agreement, OP ANAL (the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
in Latin America) can carry out special inspections at the request of any contracting party
303 J.R. Redick, 'The Tlatelolco Regime and Nonproliferation in Latin America' in 
Quester, op.cit., p.103.
304 V. Shestov, 'The Non-Proliferation Treaty in Action', International Affairs 
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1981. Susan Strange also urges the examination of the underlying bargain in 'regimes': 
Strange, op.cit.
307 Walczak, op.cit, p.239.
75.
to search for undeclared items or activities within a state, whereas the IAEA has been 
limited to the control of items notified to it^OS Protocol 1 to the Tlatelolco Treaty also 
prohibits the deployment of NW within the zone covered by the Treaty, which exceeds 
the NPT obligations which tolerate stationed nuclear weapons. The U.S. declined to 
ratify Protocol 1 until recently (under the Reagan administration). Another major 
difference between the NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco is that unlike the former, the 
latter does not enshrine two classes of unequal participants - NWS and NNWS. All 
obligations under the latter treaty are formally equal, not heavier for NNWS309
(c) IAEA Safeguards and the Promotion of Nuclear Science
Nye says of safeguards, that The initial acceptance of such intrusion was slow and 
halting, but the idea was successfully implanted in the 1950s'310 and that international 
'safeguards' and the IAEA were central to the 'basic bargain' of the regime, which was 
assistance to countries 'in their peaceful nuclear energy needs in return for their accepting 
the intrusion of safeguards and inspection'^ ^  .. Under the NNPR NPT members must 
be subject to IAEA safeguards in relation to the transfer of source and fissionable material 
and associated equipment and material, which, under Article IV, must not impede 
international co-operation in the research, production and use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes. At the time of the negotiation of the NPT, this provision of nuclear 
assistance by the IAEA could have been crucial in 'buying o ff potential opposition to 
safeguards, but with the decline in the international nuclear energy market, this assistance 
is likely to add little support for the regime today.
The term 'safeguards' also seems to assure that nuclear energy production processes are 
controlled; kept safe and guarded^ 2 In fact 'safeguards' are not about preventing the
308 Shaker, op.cit., pp.688-689. At the recent fourth review conference of the NPT the 
issue of special IAEA inspections of undeclared activities was opened for review and is 
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311 Nye,'Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime', op.cit., p.17.
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illicit diversion of nuclear materials, except by threat of censure - they merely enable the 
ex post facto detection of transgressions^^.
IAEA safeguards agreements are negotiated with NPT parties; NNWS are required to 
file detailed reports to the IAEA on their nuclear activities, and the IAEA's international 
inspectors conduct on-site inspections of facilities to ensure, through verification of 
materials accounting, that diversion of nuclear material to military production has not 
taken place.
The use of the terms 'successfully implanted', 'safeguards' and 'needs' here reflects pro- 
nuclear attitudes. '[IJmplanted' suggests that a powerful tenderer of the world garden - 
the benevolent hegemon - had performed an act of fertility and nurtured a struggling seed 
with propagative potential. This wholesome image of success works rhetorically against 
the argument that safeguards requirements are in many ways inadequate and that the work 
of the IAEA is undermined by its emphasis, until very recently, on its promotion of 
nuclear energy314 The Fourth NPT Review Conference also noted that fifty-one state 
parties to the NPT have yet to conclude safeguards agreements in compliance with Article 
III.4 of the NPT^ 15 Moreover, it has been argued that the IAEA has failed to perform 
the role initially conceived for it. Its original purpose was apparently to 'syphon off 
stockpiles of fissile material to remove the temptation of diversion to military use, but no 
more than token amounts have been retrieved^l^ Concern was expressed about this 
issue also at the recent review conference^l^
313 Patterson, op.cit., pp.32-33. Remedies available to the IAEA could however be the 
withdrawl of assistance, the suspension of available rights and privileges, or the urging 
of Security Council action: Schwartz, op.cit., pp.12-13.
314 Greig, op.cit.; J.A. Camilleri, 'The Myth of the Peaceful Atom' Millenium: Journal 
of International Studies, vol.6, no.2, 1977, pp.111-127; J. Rotblat, 'Cooperation of 
NWS and NNWS to Achieve Nonproliferation', in W. Epstein and B.T. Feld, New 
Directions in Disarmament. Praeger, New York, 1981, pp.120 -130 atp.128.
315 Australia. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, The Fourth Non-Proliferation 
Treaty Review Conference, op.cit., p.8.
316 D. Fischer, Raising the Barriers to the Creation of New Nuclear Arsenals, 
Conference Paper, Conference on Non-Proliferation in a Disarming World: Prospects for 
the 1990s, Groupe de Bellerive Vlth International Colloquium, Geneva, June 20-21, 
1990, pp.1-7 at p.6.
317 ibid.
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The term 'needs' also suggest that the development of nuclear energy was an essential 
requirement of development, a necessity or indispensable import - when it is equally 
arguable that the nuclear energy option wa a highly contentious and even undesirable 
policy option for developing economies. Thus through language, Nye's text forecloses 
criticisms.
Neither Nye or Smith address the Israeli attack on Iraq's Osirak and Isis reactors near 
Baghdad in June 1981 as a major threat to the credibility of the NNPR - again reflecting 
the concerns of U.S. foreign policy. As Poneman and Gummett have noted, that attack 
demonstrated an extreme lack of confidence in the NNPR, including its 
'safeguards'*^ 8. 'Positive' security guarantees under the NPT did not deter Israel from 
attacking the Iraqi reactor and doubts in the safeguards system were confirmed by Iraq's 
temporary refusal to allow inspection after the attack. The incident also highlights the 
importance of regional politics, not superpower policies, for proliferation^ 19. The 
recent apparent determination of the U.S. to destroy Iraqi nuclear potential also 
demonstrates a similar lack of satisfaction with the NNPR and its procedures.
'Safeguards' today are also criticised for being subject to discretionary withdrawal and 
material can be retransferred by a receiving state to a third state under safeguards without 
the consent of the supplier. 'Safeguards' may also not be strong enough to prevent 
diversion to military use. 'Safeguards' requirements are expensive and depend on 
imported technical expertise to meet the accounting requirements for less developed 
countries, and they are ultimately weak since the agency is understaffed and safeguarded 
states are free to reject inspections by particular inspectors. The IAEA has only periodic, 
not continuous inspections; it gives advance notice of inspections; its procedures are 
confidential; its instrumentation has been described as inadequate and it has difficulty in 
securing accurate measurements^20 However, the NPT review conferences have 
generally expressed satisfaction with the operation of the safeguards system and various 
improvements have been agreed at the recent Fourth Review Conference.
318 As does the Allied bombing of Iraqi nuclear reactors in the 1990-91 Gulf War.
319 Gummett, op.cit., p.566; Poneman, op.cit., p.568.
320 Schwartz, op.cit., pp.12-13; Australia. Parliament, Disarmament and Arms Control 
in the Nuclear Age. Report of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986, pp.535-536.
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A Foucauldian critique of the safeguards regime would suggest that it embodies 
sophisticated technologies of surveillance and confessional _ an internalisation of 
disciplinary norms corqmon in the 'developed' state^22 Perhaps so, but in the absence 
of confidence without verification and inspection, this seems inevitable.
A large number states have also failed to conclude the required agreements with the 
IAEA323 which should further 'disrupt' sanguinity about the IAEA. However no 
diversion or misuse of safeguarded facilities has been detected since the sixties; there has 
only been one case of the retransfer of safeguarded materials, and there has only been a 
brief interregnum where facilities in India and Pakistan were not safeguarded when 
diversion could have occurred^24 IAEA inspection difficulties have however been 
experienced in Iraq, Iran and Libya^25 and the strains on the effectiveness of safeguards 
with the rapid expansion of nuclear activities in the seventies has also been
documented326.
321 Keeley, 'Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of international regimes', op.cit., pp.92,
101.
322 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Penguin, 
Harmonds worth, 1977.
323 Fifty-one as reported at the Fourth NPT Review Conference: Australia. Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Agreed Review Conference Language',op.cit., p.8, 
paragraph 21.
324 But safeguards do not apply in certain plants in Argentina, India, Israel, Pakistan and 
South Africa, and may not be completely effective in Brazil or Chile.
325 D. Fischer and P. Szasz, Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal, ed. J. 
Goldblat,Taylor and Francis, London, 1985,
326 Scheinman, op. cit., pp.270-271.
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CONCLUSIONS
This sub-thesis has critically assessed various articles which analyse the NNPR within 
the broad framework of 'regime' theory. An attempt has been made to adapt Derridean 
deconstructive technique and Foucauldian analyses. Some difficulty arose from the fact 
that some of the points selected for 'deconstruction' tended to be covered or contradicted 
in at least one of the other texts. It has been argued nevertheless that claims that the 
regime was largely created as a product of superpower hegemony is 'logocentric 
discourse' which can be inter-textually contrasted with other texts which represent less 
univocally the long history of United Nations denunciations of nuclear weaponry and 
which do not so minimise the important contribution that non-aligned and neutral states 
made to the negotiation of regime instruments such as the NPT and the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco. The constituent elements of the regime as respresented in Nye's and Smith's 
texts have been deconstruced, as have particular ideas such as power and hegemony in 
the regime's formation and maintenance. It has also been argued that Nye's and Smith's 
texts also marginalise or reduce the significance of current Euratom policies and their 
diminution of IAEA universality, and have largley ignored the resistant practices of many 
states . This is a hegemonic 'enframing' practice which prioritises the superpowers', and 
in particular, the U.S. role and its interests.
It has also been argued that claims that the regime has strengthened significantly in recent 
years is correct but that the constant criticism that has been made about the failure of the 
nuclear weapon states to honour the spirit of the disarmament and arms control 
obligations on the NWS, and the grievances expressed by some less developed states that 
unilaterally tightened supplier restrictions were discriminatory and in breach of regime 
norms have also been marginalised in Nye's and Smith's texts.
As to the prospective possibilities of these texts - the contradiction in both Nye's and 
Smith's work - that nuclear deterrence has maintained stability in the superpower 
relationship weakens the prospective value of their views, for these suggest that a decline 
in superpower hegemony and a loosening of the alliance system may encourage smaller 
states to acquire independent nuclear deterrents^ 2 7 Nye's and 
Smith's arguments on 'learning' are not sufficiently convincing to suggest that the NNPR 
may teach states to forego that option if regional politics encourage it. However there is 
little evidence presented that extended deterrence and security guarantees under the 
NNPR, or alongside it, were determinative in allies’ nuclear stand, and the notion of
327 This argument is also presented by A. Mack, op.cit, p.4.
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extended deterrence has always been problematic. Moreover, other considerations such 
as the strength of the domestic pro and anti-nuclear lobbies (such as social movement, 
scientific, bureaucratic, and military interests), and the increased availability of small, 
'tactical' nuclear weapons now may be more determinative in the issue of NW 
acquisition.
On the other hand, the availability of cheaper alternatives such as chemical weapons may 
render the nuclear 'option' less attractive. This has little to do with the NNPR, except 
that some states may allege reluctance to agree to chemical and biological restrictions on 
the basis that NWS have not kept their side of the NPT bargain. To the extent that the 
terms of regional strategic discourse are now more often including references to common 
security, rather than collective security, NW acquisition may be less desirable328 but 
this also is not linked expressly with the NNPR although it is in consonance with it.
The concerns of the eighties about vertical proliferation by nuclear weapon states, and by 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union in particular, are unlikely to jeopardise the 1995 review 
conference on the NPT. U.S.- Soviet relations have improved substantially in recent 
years and relatively significant, if not absolutely significant, progress in disarmament 
talks have taken place. In 1987 the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty negotiations 
eliminated U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range ground launched nuclear missiles world­
wide, while in 1985 U.S-Soviet Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) began in Geneva, 
covering strategic nuclear arms, space and defence issues. Bilateral talks on nuclear 
testing are also p ro ceed in g s^  an(j verification protocols to the Threshold Test Ban 
Treaty ( IT BT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) have recently been 
signed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The fact that these agreements have reduced 
force levels rather than crisis stability has been noted by some commentators330? ancj 
may be that the time-lags in reaching arms control agreements on weapons systems that 
are yet to be deployed will continue to raise the angst of NNWS regarding the 
discriminatory nature of the treaty. Optimism has also been raised by substantial progress
328 See A. Mack, 'Alternative Defence Concepts: The European Debate', Working Paper 
No.68. Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1989.
329 United Kingdom. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 'Arms Control Agreements', 
Background Brief. June 1990, Annex B.
330 Noted above. See Mack, op.cit.
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in the U.S. and Soviet START negotiations on reducing strategic nuclear weapons^ 1. 
However, the announcement by the U.S. that it will not subscribe to the call for the 
introduction of a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty bodes ill for the 1995 review, as does 
the failure to include maritime nuclear weapons in disarmament negotiations^^.
As noted above, the issue of continued nuclear testing has severely strained relations 
between NNWS and the U.S. and the U.K. in particular, and some non-aligned states 
have insisted on making the NPT extension in 1995 conditional on securing a 
Comprehensive Test Ban. This does not appear to be the major threat to the regime 
despite current U.S. policies^^-^, because only a minority of states seem determined to 
hinge the future of the NPT on the CTB issue, and the Conference on Disarmament has 
recently agreed on a mandate for the re-commissioning of debate on a nuclear testing 
ban-334. However, this development contintues trends manifest earlier in the history of 
the NNPR, although one could not trace this well in either Nye's or Smith's texts.
As to 'learning' under the NNPR, the reasons for the improvement in bilateral 
superpower relations and the ending of the Cold War in Europe are varied, including the 
costs of maintaining extended empires, the international economic crisis and the peace 
movement's opposition to NATO's nuclear modernisation plans, amongst others. There 
does not seem to have been much research yet done on the NNPR as a significant 
causative agent in this process, despite scholars recent focus on 'learning'.
The decline in the power of the U.S. is unlikely to feature significantly in the danger areas 
of the nineties since some 'pariah' states such as Iraq, South Africa and Libya are already 
at the margins of the international alliance system. Libya is reported to be increasing its 
ties with Brazil and Libya's interest in acquiring enrichment sand reprocessing technology
331 M. Dejevsky and B. Boswell, 'Nuclear hope in new summit plan', The Australian. 2 
August, 1990, p.9; S. Clyne, 'From Start to Finish: Beyond the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks', Pacific Research, vol.3, no.3, pp. 3 -6.
332 Mack, op.cit., p.5; Pegasus Network, 'NATO Acquires Sea Launched Cruise 
Missiles', SANA Update, vol.85, 1990, p. 11.
333 W. Epstein, 'The Nuclear Testing Threat', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 
vol.46, no.6, 1990, pp.34 -37; Findlay, op.cit., pp.13-15.
334 Hon. Senator Gareth Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Nuclear non­
proliferation: the continuing challenge', Address to the Fourth NPT Review Conference 
in Geneva on 23 August 1990, reproduced in 'Special Disarmament Issue', 
Backgrounder, op.cit., pp.4 -6, at p.5.
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from Brazil is raising proliferation concerns335 South Africa, hitherto a pariah state, 
has recently agreed to ratify the treaty provided its neighbours do336? and a regional 
nuclear free agreement for Africa has been agreed to in principle337 North Korea 
justifies its failure to sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, despite being an NPT 
member with a functioning unsafeguarded facility, and is apparently actively seeking 
nuclear capability because of the perceived 'U.S. threat' of stationed nuclear weapons in 
South K o re a n s . Recent progress in Korean re-unification talks, and a reduction in the 
U.S. presence on the peninsula in the long-term may not reduce this proliferation concern 
either given Japan's increasing military strength and plutonium stockpile. As noted 
above, Israel's refusal to accede to the NPT seriously threatens the NPT for Arab states 
resent Israel's 'free-riding' on the security of their accession. The prospects of Israel 
signing the NPT, closing down its Dimona facility, accepting IAEA full-scope 
safeguards or joining the Egyptian-sponsored regional nuclear-free zone^39 appear 
slim, but prospects are uncertain given the extreme volatility of the Middle East at present. 
If the U.S. attains its aim of reducing the strength of Iraqi military power and destroys its 
nuclear potential, and succeeds in securing a long-term presence in Saudi Arabia, Israel 
may be more disposed to dismantle its nuclear capability. However, given the 
proliferation in the region of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, this 
also seems unlikely.
To the extent that hegemonic, deterrent doctrines have had little positive effect within the 
NNPR, the treaty should be amended to account more for regional considerations. For 
example, if breeder reactors were to become more economically attractive, they and their 
supporting plants should be built under regional auspices^4 0  Other major
335 'Excerpts from L. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb'. SANA Update, vol.85, 1990, 
P-7.
336 Mozambique joined recently but Angola has not yet become a member.
337 Hon. Sen. Gareth Evans, op.cit.
338 Anon, ' North Still Saying No To Nuclear Safeguards', Pacific Research, vol.3, 
no.3, 1990, pp.12-13.
339 Simpson, op.cit., p.39.
340 This is one of the suggested amendments from D. Fischer, 'Raising the Barriers to 
the Creation of New Nuclear Arsenals', op.cit., p.4.
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improvements such as the inclusion of nuclear-capable delivery systems and nuclear 
infrastructure generally should also be included in the trea ty^ l.
The prospect of France and China becoming more closely aligned with the NNPR is 
encouraging, though both only sent observers to the 1990 review conference^ 42 
France's continual flouting of international opposition to nuclear testing in the Pacific, its 
past lax nuclear and ballistic missile technology export policies towards Iraq, Pakistan, 
India, Israel and South Africa, and its reported agreement in February 1990 to sell a 
nuclear reactor to Pakistan with a waiver over IAEA safeguards'^, suggest the France 
is not very serious about the NPT. Although these states' attendance may be cited by 
some as an example of a willingness to learn, France's attendance at the review 
conference is more likely to have arisen from France's perceived need to improve 
relations within Euratom in the light of significantly improved regionalism in the 
European Economic Community. It may also have been designed to encourage Germany 
to remain within the NNPR, although that is assured. It may also have been oriented to 
strengthening Euratom at a time when German reunification and West Germany's 
amassing of significant stockpiles of plutonium has raised proliferation concems^^.
The extent to which nuclear fuel reprocessing is providing Japan and Germany with large 
amounts of plutonium, raises clear proliferation concerns, although it is generally 
acknowledged that if such states wished to develop nuclear arsenals there would be little 
to stop them. Given domestic political opposition to nuclear weaponry that is highly 
unlikely. Both Japan and Germany agreed at the Fourth Review Conference to adopt a 
policy of full-scope safeguards for nuclear supply so to some extent the retransfer 
concerns about Japanese and German plutonium have been alleviated and this indicates a 
major strengthening of the regirne-^^^.
341 G. Thompson, 'Treaty a Useful Relic'.The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol.46, 
no.6, 1990, pp.32-33 at p.32.
342 P. Jacobson, 'France to attend nuclear talks', The Australian. 5 July, 1990.
343 Anon, 'France and the nuclear free-for-all', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 
vol.46, no.6, 1990, p.18.
344 Leventhal, op.cit., p.6.
345 Van Doren and Bunn, op.cit., p.10.
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The arguments raised that a united Germany may be tempted to become a NWS to counter 
Iraq or Israel or more friendly regional NWS are not convincing346 ancj Were scotched 
at the fourth NPT review conference when the two Germanies made a joint declaration in 
support of the spirit and text of the NPT347 A more optomistic outlook for Europe is 
far more persuasive. The 'growing disenchantment in both East and West with nuclear 
weapons'348 because of doubts about their military 'utility', recognised flaws in 
deterrence dogma, the anti-nuclear peace movement, acceptance of the nuclear winter 
theory349 an(j  a greater emphasis on common security in Europe^O all militate against 
Germany becoming a proliferation concern. Moreover, Germany and Japan have 
recently agreed to adopt a policy of full-scope safeguards for nuclear supply, thereby 
indicating strong support for the regime.
To the extent that there has been learning from the regime, it is not because of 
international learning about U.S. sponsored norms, as suggested by Nye, but may be 
because of a genuine international commitment to nonproliferation by the vast majority of 
states, or varying degrees of interest in pursuing nuclear energy programs. The 
Commission on Disarmament, the United Nations General Assembly and the NPT review 
conferences have been crucial in challenging the disarmament and arms control policies of 
several NWS and there has not been a networking of interests to the benefit of powerful 
states or classes alone within the multilateral 'regime', although there has been limited 
networking by crucial supplier states, whose Zangger Committee guidelines have been 
recently endorsed by the wider NPT community^ 1. Nor has there been a hegemony of 
dominant state scientific or military interests for the peace movement has been a dominant 
factor in western international nuclear politics.
346 H. Muller, 'Western Europe Needs Treaty', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 
vol.46, no.6, 1990, pp.28-29.
347 Van Doren and Bunn, op.cit., p.8.
348 Findlay, op.cit., p.5; Nye, 'Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security regimes', 
op.cit., pp.382-3.
349 ibid., pp.5 - 6.
350 Mack, 'Alternative Defence Concepts: The European Debate', op.cit.
351 As noted above, the recent fourth review conference however urged all supplier 
states to abide by the 'Zangger Committee' trigger list when exporting to non-nuclear- 
weapon states not party to the NPT thereby indicating a consensual strengthening of this 
aspect of the 'regime'.
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Notwithstanding this strengthening of the regime, to the extent some NNPR member 
states are pursuing nuclear capability it clearly has not been a success. The perceived 
need to resort to military force to destroy partial nuclear capability, as in the case of Iraq, 
represents a fundamental failure of the regime, even if this is only a subsidiary aspect of 
the military conflict. It demonstates a weakness in the argument about the 'hegemonic' 
norms and values of the regime. Moreover, since non-proliferation has been recognised 
as more a political than a technical matter, supplier restrictions may not be so important, 
except for 'pariah' threshold states.
Nye and Smith's texts are examples of the discursive construction of U.S. policy 
interests, even though some of those policies may be desirable. That is not to the point 
however. This type of discourse may be regarded by many as authoritative but a critical 
'deconstruction' of it suggests that it may be flawed in part.
The ease with which the NPT, as the most significant part of the NNPR, will be renewed 
in 1995 now seems likely to be most trammelled by U.S. and U.K. nuclear testing policy 
which is unlikely to change^^^, and it may also rest on a resolution of some of the 
issues underpinning the war in the Middle East. The prospects of a denuclearisation of 
that region appear slim indeed but depending on the outcome of the Gulf War, some Arab 
states may insist on Israeli denuclearisation during settlement negotiations. The broader 
economic and security advantages of the regime are likely to ultimately prevail however, 
and the NPT is likely to be renewed amidst strong condemnation of U.S. and U.K. 
nuclear testing policies.
352 Findlay, op.cit., pp. 13-15.
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